University of Oxford

Stipendiary Lecturer, Philosophy

Stipendiary Lecturer

University College

Thesis Title: The meaning of the logical constants and the role of meaning in justifying deductive inference

About

I argue that the meaning of logical constants is fixed by a core inferential role.  That needs defence from the categoricity problems, tonk-style problem and Williamson-style complaints about experts with oddball views like McGee. 

Next I argue that you can get some a priori knowledge out of knowledge of meanings in principle, even if it’s not awfully substantial.  (This is related to Boghossian's arguments for the justification of deductive inference but is considerably more modest in scope and strength).  I will eventually consider the broader issue of the epistemology of basic deductive inferences to set in perspective the contribution the kind of inferential semantics I defend for logical constants makes to that epistemology. 

I have another project uncompleted.  I'm writing about whether names in natural languages are predicates, as Burge, Hawthorne and Elbourne think they are.  I think they aren't and I have some linguistic evidence to show why.  (I'd appreciate anyone with linguistics knowledge who'd like to look at my work on this.  I don't have a linguistics background and would benefit from comments.)