Traditionalizing Philosophical Hermeneutics: Gadamer and Ricoeur on Textual Interpretation more

Traditionalizing Philosophical Hermeneutics: Gadamer and Ricoeur on Textual Interpretation Despite its long history and numerous shifts in meaning, today the term ‘hermeneutics’ is often associated with Hans-Georg Gadamer and his seminal work “Truth and Method”. Indeed, outside specialist circles, there is little awareness of those who preceded him in the history of hermeneutics or those who came after him. Nonetheless, for the history of hermeneutics, Gadamer’s contributions proved to be a double-edged sword: for, as important as Gadamer’s work has been in keeping hermeneutics alive as a discipline in the 20th century, his powerful (albeit at times undue) criticism of the hermeneutic tradition left the latter in disarray in the eyes of many, and his counter-project of an ontology of understanding broadened the scope of hermeneutics so considerably that its traditional focus on textual interpretation faded into the background, thus leaving the field open for alternative approaches.1 Whereas ‘traditional’ hermeneuts such as Schleiermacher and Dilthey considered hermeneutics in methodological terms, either as an approach to textual interpretation or as method for the human sciences,2 Gadamer’s ‘philosophical’ hermeneutics is the attempt to uncover phenomenologically what is happening in the process of human understanding.3 Impressed as he was by Heidegger’s ‘ontological turn’, whose implications he sought to spell out, Gadamer’s project might thus seem far removed 1 For instance, Gadamer’s idiosyncratic interpretations of Schleiermacher (in which Gadamer heavily relied on Dilthey) focused exclusively on the ‘psychological’ and ‘subjectivist’ dimension of Schleiermacher’s method, which in turn came to be seen as outdated. Manfred Frank’s edition of Schleiermacher’s lectures on hermeneutics and his commentary on the latter are a notable exception to this one-sided reception, see Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (1977). 2 For the focus on a method of textual interpretation, see Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (1977) Hermeneutik und Kritik. Manfred Frank (ed.). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp; for the focus on hermeneutics as a method for the human sciences over against the natural sciences, see Dilthey, W. (1979): Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften in: Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 7, Stuttgart, Göttingen, pp. 77-188. 3 Gadamer, H.-G. (2004) Truth and Method. London: continuum, p. 263. 1 from hermeneutics in the Schleiermacherian sense, which raises the question of whether it has anything to contribute to a study on textual interpretation. Put differently, can Gadamer’s hermeneutics be read in the traditional sense of the word? If so, what (if anything) are the drawbacks of such a reading? As we shall see, there are two instances in which Gadamer’s hermeneutics can offer us some insights into textual interpretation. The first is that his ontological reflections on the nature of human understanding might be seen as providing the framework within which methodological reflections are carried out, addressing broader epistemological issues with which methodologists rarely engage. Still, one might object that ontological analyses, by their very nature, are fairly abstract and thus of little ‘practical’ use in the interpretation of texts. This is not so in the case of Gadamer, who in “Truth and Method” vacillates between ontological analyses and normative suggestions. Unintentionally perhaps, Gadamer offers us recommendations regarding the aims of textual interpretation and he gives us some guidelines we ought to follow in the execution of our interpretive task. Such suggestions and regulative principles creep into his text in numerous places. That they do should not surprise us because, as Paul Ricoeur put it, an ontological endeavour, “free at the outset from any methodological requirements and consequently outside the circle of interpretation whose theory this ontology formulates” would amount to a performative contradiction.4 Thus, there is nothing in Gadamer’s hermeneutics that prohibits the reading here suggested. On the contrary, as the Wirkungsgeschichte of “Truth and Method” shows, Gadamer’s hermeneutics has been treated as an approach to literary theory, as a corrective to dogmatic elements in other approaches, and it has inspired other 4 Ricoeur, P. (2004a) The Conflict of Interpretations. Essays in Hermeneutics. London, continuum, p. 6. 2 methods.5 Before we can begin, two caveats must be removed, however. Gadamer’s “Truth and Method” is often read as advocating an outright rejection of methods in the human sciences.6 To be sure, Gadamer dismissed the natural sciences and its disinterested, pseudo-objective account of ‘method’ as a role model for the arts and humanities, particularly with regard to studies in interpretation, but Gadamer never rejected methodological reflections tout court. Rather, he considered them secondary to his ontological enquiry into the nature of understanding.7 According to Gadamer, interpretation presupposes pre-reflective understanding, that is, understanding which precedes any methodological discussion.8 But this is just to say that there is something in the interpretive process that raises questions that transcend the scope of methodological reflection, which in no way undermines such projects.9 In short, Gadamer does not reject methodological reflection per se but considers it as subsidiary to his ontology of understanding, with textual interpretation being one of its many concrete manifestations. The second caveat is that an orientation occasioned in the manner sketched out here comes at a certain price; for in trying to deduce what is methodologically relevant from Gadamer’s “Truth and Method” we are confronted with the problem of having to translate what Gadamer says about interpretation as an event to the level of 5 For the reception of his hermeneutics within literary theory, see, for example, Becker, S. (2007) Literatur- und Kulturwissenschaften. Ihre Theorien und Methoden. Reinbeck: Rowohlts Enzyklopädie, p. 28-32. For other approaches Gadamer has inspired, see, for instance, Iser, W. (1984) Der Akt des Lesers. Theorie ästhetischer Wirkung. Second edition. Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink; Jauß, H.R. (1982) Ästhetische Erfahrung und literarische Hermeneutik. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Gadamer, H.-G. (2004) Truth and Method, p. 275, 279. Henceforth cited as TM. 6 Tugendhat provided such a reading of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics in his review for the Times Literay Supplement (May 19 1978). He suggested that the title of his book should be interpreted as “Truth versus Method” (1978: 165). 7 Gadamer, TM, p. 2. 8 Ibid., p. 275, 279. 9 Cf. Outhwaite, W. (2000) Hans-Georg Gadamer, in: Quentin Skinner (ed.) The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 32. 3 interpretation as an act performed by an interpreter.10 Fortunately, Gadamer himself vacillates between the two levels, as we noted above, and he placed the principle of application at the center of his hermeneutics—a principle which, as its name indicates, recommends the application of the text to one’s own interpretive situation and problem, regardless of whatever the author may have intended. Whilst the bulk of this chapter will deal with Gadamer’s hermeneutics, in section V we will also consider Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, although no attempt will be made to do justice to the details of Ricoeur’s position, as this would require a separate study. Two reasons might, nonetheless, justify his inclusion. First of all, Ricoeur sought to combine the ontological with the methodological dimension, as we do in this chapter. Secondly, Ricoeur, who developed his hermeneutics in part as a critical response to Gadamer, may be read as offering a corrective to issues that Gadamer’s hermeneutics left unresolved. Throughout, I shall argue that Gadamer’s hermeneutics gets caught up between two incompatible interpretive aims. On the one hand, Gadamer emphasizes the applicative manner in which we understand text, which recommends the assimilation of the text to the interpreters’ situation; on the other he claims that we ought to recognize the otherness of the text and the truth it conveys about the subject matter. The chapter is structured in the following way. In the two subsequent sections, I will critically assess core concepts of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, moving from the more ontological aspects (in section II) to the ‘practical’ side of his approach (in III). I then go on to draw some interpretive lessons from Gadamer’s hermeneutics (in IV). This requires that I shall bracket out the more ontological aspects of his position. I then attempt to show where Ricoeur distances himself from Gadamer and what 10 For the distinction, see Vandevelde, P. (2005) The Task of the Interpreter. Text, Meaning, and Negotation. Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, p. 15. 4 solutions he offers to the problems Gadamer’s hermeneutics failed to solve. 5