Fission, cohabitation, and the concern for future survival

Forthcoming in Analysis 70.2 (April 2010)

Bilking the Bilking Argument

Forthcoming in Analysis 69.4 (October 2009)

A Defence of Quasi-Memory

Philosophy 81 (2006): 323-355.

Mellor and Dennett on the Perception of Temporal Order

Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 231-238.

How do we determine precedence?  More specifically, what part of our experience facilitates our assessment of the temporal order of perceived events?  I shall be looking here at the account offered by Mellor, who argues that since there is no one sensation peculiar to the perception of precedence, it must therefore be the actual temporal order of the perceptions of two events which allows us to represent the temporal order of the events perceived.  I shall defend this account against criticism by Dennett, who claims that it is the content of our perceptions, rather than their timing, which primarily allows us to determine the temporal order of the perceived events.  I shall argue that the two accounts are compatible.

Ethics, Speculation, and Values

Nanoethics 2 (2008): 317-327

Some writers claim that ethicists involved in assessing future technologies like nanotechnology and human enhancement devote too much time to debating issues that may or may not arise, at the expense of addressing more urgent, current issues.  This practice has been claimed to squander the scarce and valuable resource of ethical concern.  I assess this view, and consider some alternatives to ‘speculative ethics’ that have been put forward.  I argue that attempting to restrict ethical debate so as to avoid considering unacceptably speculative scenarios would not only leave scientific progress devoid of ethical guidance, but would also rule out some of our most important ethical projects.  I conclude that the issue of speculation is a red herring: what is most important is not that ethicists concentrate on current issues or those that are most likely to arise; but that ethicists, scientists, and others focus on maximising what is most valuable.

Should we Enhance Self-Esteem?

Philosophica 79 (2007): 71-91.

The conviction that high self-esteem is beneficial both to the individual and to society in general has been pervasive both in academia and in popular culture.  If it is indeed beneficial, it is a prime candidate for pharmacological enhancement.  There is evidence to suggest, however, that the benefits of high self-esteem to the individual have been exaggerated; and that there are few - if any - social benefits.  With this evidence in mind, I consider in what ways high self-esteem is valuable, and suggest how enhancement could play a role in maximising its valuable aspects.

CORRECTION.  Page 84, final paragraph, line 5: 'and failures, and' should be omitted.

Enhancement and Cheating

Expositions 2.2 (2008): 153-156

Review of Jonathan Glover's Choosing Children

Philosophical Books 49/1 (2008): 76-78.

Ethical Issues in Human Enhancement

In J. Ryberg, T. Petersen, and C. Wolf (eds.) New Waves in Applied Ethics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 120-152.  Co-authored with Nick Bostrom.

Bioconservatism, Bioliberalism, and Repugnance

Monash Bioethics Review 28 (1): 4.1-4.21. DOI: 10.2104/mber0904.  Co-authored with Steve Clarke.

We consider the current debate between bioconservatives and their opponents—whom we dub bioliberals—about the moral acceptability of human enhancement and the policy implications of moral debates about enhancement. We argue that this debate has reached an impasse, largely because bioconservatives hold that we should honour intuitions about the special value of being human, even if we cannot identify reasons to ground those intuitions. We argue that although intuitions are often a reliable guide to belief and action, there are circumstances in which they are not reliable. Intuitions—including intuitions about enhancement—are subject to various cognitive biases rendering them unreliable in some circumstances. We argue that many bioconservative intuitions about enhancement are examples of such unreliable intuitions. Given this, it is unrealistic of bioconservatives to expect others to rely on their unexamined intuitions. Furthermore, refusing to engage in debates about the reasons and values that underpin their intuitions about enhancement will have the effect of making bioconservative voices less relevant in policy debates about enhancement than they would otherwise be.

Smart Policy: Cognitive Enhancement and the Public Interest

Forthcoming in J. Savulescu, R. ter Muelen, and G. Kahane (eds.), Enhancing Human Capabilities (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).  Co-authored with Nick Bostrom.