Using matching and regression analyses, we measure the difference in citations between articles posted to Academia.edu and other articles from similar journals, controlling for field, impact factor, and other variable... more abstractUsing matching and regression analyses, we measure the difference in citations between articles posted to Academia.edu and other articles from similar journals, controlling for field, impact factor, and other variables. Based on a sample size of 31,216 papers, we find that a paper in a median impact factor journal uploaded to Academia.edu receives 16% more citations after one year than a similar article not available online, 51% more citations after three years, and 69% after five years. We also found that articles also posted to Academia.edu had 58% more citations than articles only posted to other online venues, such as personal and departmental home pages, after five years. This is a revised version that has been accepted for publication in PLOS ONE. The updated paper, dataset, and code, as well as previous versions of each, are available on the Github repo: https://github.com/polynumeral/academia-citations

Social Networks, Social Networking, Open Access, Bibliometrics, Scientometrics, and 8 more

We often make content ascriptions to subjects that are assertable despite being literally false, in the sense that the subject does not literally have the content that we are ascribing to them. The ascriptions are clo... more abstractWe often make content ascriptions to subjects that are assertable despite being literally false, in the sense that the subject does not literally have the content that we are ascribing to them. The ascriptions are close enough to the truth, and in the conversational context it is convenient to be a little loose in one’s content ascriptions. In this paper, I shall give some examples of one kind of non-literal content ascription, and then propose a constraint, which I call the reversibility constraint, which distinguishes instances of this kind of non-literal content ascription from literal content ascriptions. I will then apply this constraint to looks-statements, and argue that the reversibility constraint can help us decide which looks-statements report the contents of visual experiences, and which do not. I will argue for the conclusion that ‘that apple looks to the left of me’ does not report the content of my visual experience when I do not see myself.

Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy Of Language, What Properties Experience Represents, and Philosophy of perception

More Info: Published in Philosophical Perspectives, volume 19 (1), Blackwell, 2005, 353-374

John Searle and Susanna Siegel have argued that cases of aspect-switching show that visual experience represents a richer range of properties than colours, shapes, positions and sizes. I argue that cases of aspect-swi... more abstractJohn Searle and Susanna Siegel have argued that cases of aspect-switching show that visual experience represents a richer range of properties than colours, shapes, positions and sizes. I argue that cases of aspect-switching can be explained without holding that visual experience represents rich properties. I also provide an argument that, even if Searle and Siegel are right, and aspect-switching does require visual experience to represent rich properties, there is reason to think those properties do not include natural kind properties, such as being a tomato.

Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, What Properties Experience Represents, and Philosophy of perception

More Info: Published in Philosophical Quarterly July 2009

Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Visual perception, and Philosophy of perception

More Info: Forthcoming in Mind

Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy Of Language, Consciousness, Phenomenal Concepts, and 1 more

More Info: Forthcoming in the Philosophical Review.

This is a short piece that I wrote for my students, outlining some tips on how to write philosophy essays.

Philosophy

This is the introduction of my thesis. I discuss the ways in which past and contemporary philosophers have approached the question of the visible/non-visible distinction. I also discuss some distinctions which are sim... more abstractThis is the introduction of my thesis. I discuss the ways in which past and contemporary philosophers have approached the question of the visible/non-visible distinction. I also discuss some distinctions which are similar to, but distinct from, the visible/non-visible distinction.

Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, What Properties Experience Represents, and Philosophy of perception

Philosophers have often raised the question what kind of information is available to vision. For instance, Berkeley argued that one could not see depth, Hume argued that one could not see necessary connections and, ac... more abstractPhilosophers have often raised the question what kind of information is available to vision. For instance, Berkeley argued that one could not see depth, Hume argued that one could not see necessary connections and, according to Paul Guyer, Kant held that there is no perception of change, but only change of perception (Guyer 2004). Recently philosophers have asked what kinds of properties visual experience represents. According to sparse views, visual experience represents a sparse range of properties, for instance just colours, shapes, positions and sizes (see McGinn 1982, Burge 2003, Millar 2000). According to rich views, visual experience represents a rich range of properties, for instance properties such as being a tomato, and being sad (see Peacocke 2003, Siegel 2006, Searle 1983, McDowell 1998b). In this thesis I discuss some questions arising from the above debate. Instead of using the terminology of what properties visual experience represents, I define a kind of looking, phenomenal looking, which is individuated in terms of differences in visual phenomenal character, and I raise the question what kinds of properties objects phenomenally look to have.

Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, What Properties Experience Represents, and Philosophy of perception

In this chapter I identify a certain kind of looking, which I call phenomenal looking, and I explore what properties objects phenomenally look to have. I argue that objects phenomenally look to have only colours and p... more abstractIn this chapter I identify a certain kind of looking, which I call phenomenal looking, and I explore what properties objects phenomenally look to have. I argue that objects phenomenally look to have only colours and positions, and that the colour properties do not include determinables such as being red.

Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, What Properties Experience Represents, and Philosophy of perception

This is an updated version of my paper 'Content Ascriptions and the Reversibility Constraint'. I argue that there is a tension between the fact that singular terms are exportable from within the scope of mental state ... more abstractThis is an updated version of my paper 'Content Ascriptions and the Reversibility Constraint'. I argue that there is a tension between the fact that singular terms are exportable from within the scope of mental state ascriptions, and the view that objects phenomenally look to the left and right of me.

Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy Of Language, What Properties Experience Represents, and Philosophy of perception

In this chapter, I offer some further arguments that the position properties that objects phenomenally look to us to have are not observer-relative ones (i.e. are not ones such as being to the left of me, and being in... more abstractIn this chapter, I offer some further arguments that the position properties that objects phenomenally look to us to have are not observer-relative ones (i.e. are not ones such as being to the left of me, and being in front of me).

Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, What Properties Experience Represents, and Philosophy of perception

In the last two chapters we have considered a number of views about the nature of the position properties that objects phenomenally look to have: the observer-relative view, the field-of-view relationalist view, the L... more abstractIn the last two chapters we have considered a number of views about the nature of the position properties that objects phenomenally look to have: the observer-relative view, the field-of-view relationalist view, the Leibnizian relationalist view, and the substantivalist view. All of these views seem to face serious objections. In this chapter I shall sketch a positive view about the nature of phenomenal position properties, which I call primitivism.

Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, What Properties Experience Represents, and Philosophy of perception

In this chapter I use a thought experiment to argue that objects could phenomenally look to have z coordinates, in addition to phenomenally looking to have x and y coordinates. I also argue that the thought experiment... more abstractIn this chapter I use a thought experiment to argue that objects could phenomenally look to have z coordinates, in addition to phenomenally looking to have x and y coordinates. I also argue that the thought experiment gives us reason to think that objects do phenomenally look to have z coordinates, in addition to phenomenally looking to have x and y coordinates.

Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, What Properties Experience Represents, and Philosophy of perception

In this chapter, I consider how objects might phenomenally look to beings with more coarse-grained visual systems than us. Many hold that to such beings, objects may phenomenally look red, without phenomenally looking... more abstractIn this chapter, I consider how objects might phenomenally look to beings with more coarse-grained visual systems than us. Many hold that to such beings, objects may phenomenally look red, without phenomenally looking a particular shade of red. David Armstrong expresses this intuition as follows: ‘It is perfectly possible… to have a mental image of a piece of crimson cloth of no particular shade of crimson.’ In this chapter I try to make intuitions of the kind that Armstrong has precise, and I try to make some progress towards evaluating them.

Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, What Properties Experience Represents, and Philosophy of perception

This is the bibliography for my thesis.

This is the whole of my thesis.

Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, What Properties Experience Represents, and Philosophy of perception

Location: Oxford Philosophy Department

Event Date: Mar 21, 2007

Organization: The Admissible Contents of Experience

Below is the abstract that was circulated for this talk. The ideas from this talk were changed, and eventually made it into Chapter 6 of my thesis (available on my papers page). Chapter 6 of my thesis contains my late... more abstractBelow is the abstract that was circulated for this talk. The ideas from this talk were changed, and eventually made it into Chapter 6 of my thesis (available on my papers page). Chapter 6 of my thesis contains my latest views on this topic. Suppose that patch A looks scarlet to us, and patch B looks crimson to us. Consider a being which cannot visually discriminate between scarlet and crimson; i.e. a being with more coarse-grained visual experiences than us. How would patches A and B look to such a being? According to the deleted colour view, either A and B both look scarlet or they both look crimson to this being: the being sees fewer colours than us. According to the neutrality view, A and B look to this being some colour, red*, that is neutral between scarlet and crimson. There are different ways of understanding this notion of neutrality. On the disjunctive understanding of neutrality, being red* is being either scarlet or crimson, so that A looks either scarlet or crimson to the being. On the one-many similarity understanding of neutrality, red* is a colour that bears a relation of one-many similarity to scarlet and crimson. In this talk I will present the details of the above three accounts of coarse-grained experiences, and suggest some reasons for being doubtful of the disjunctive view.

Time: 8 PM

Location: Oxford Philosophy Department

Event Date: Nov 22, 2005

Organization: Ockham Society

This paper ended up as Chapter 1 of my thesis, available on my Papers page ('A Sparse View About The Properties That Objects Look To Have')

Location: National Postgraduate Analytic Philosophy Conference

Event Date: Jul 16, 2005

A later version of this paper was published in Philosophical Perspectives as 'Content Ascriptions and the Reversibility Constraint', available on my papers page. A later version of that paper became Chapter 2 of m... more abstractA later version of this paper was published in Philosophical Perspectives as 'Content Ascriptions and the Reversibility Constraint', available on my papers page. A later version of that paper became Chapter 2 of my thesis ('The Tension Between Exportation And The View That Objects Phenomenally Look To The Left And Right Of Me'), available on my papers page. The thesis chapter has my latest views on the topic.

Location: Harvard/MIT Graduate Conference

Event Date: Mar 20, 2005

Below is the abstract that was circulated with the talk. The ideas from this talk ended up, in a modified form, in Section 4 of Chapter 4 of my thesis, available on my papers page. Chapter 4 of my thesis contains my l... more abstractBelow is the abstract that was circulated with the talk. The ideas from this talk ended up, in a modified form, in Section 4 of Chapter 4 of my thesis, available on my papers page. Chapter 4 of my thesis contains my latest views on this topic. In this talk, I discuss and motivate two hypotheses about the content of visual experience: 1.) that everything could look smaller to you than to me, without there being any behavioural difference between us. 2.) that everything could look further to the left to you than to me, without there being any behavioural difference between us. I will finish by discussing some of the consequences these hypotheses have for the content of visual experience.

Time: 8 PM

Location: Oxford Philosophy Department

Event Date: Mar 15, 2005

Organization: Ockham Society

This was a talk I gave to the Invariants Society, a Mathematics Society at Oxford. The talk discussed three paradoxes. See the iPaper file below.

Location: The Invariants Society (Oxford Mathematics Society).

Event Date: Jan 25, 2005

This talk eventually ended up as Chapter 2 of my thesis, available on my papers page.

Location: Warwick Graduate Conference

Event Date: Nov 28, 2004

Below is the abstract that was circulated with the talk. I don't now agree with all the arguments in this talk. However, a version of one of the arguments in this talk made it into Chapter 1 of my thesis (section 4.2 ... more abstractBelow is the abstract that was circulated with the talk. I don't now agree with all the arguments in this talk. However, a version of one of the arguments in this talk made it into Chapter 1 of my thesis (section 4.2 of that chapter, 'The Vagueness Argument'), which is available on my papers page. Abstract In this talk I will argue that objects do not look red, but look only determinate shades of red (e.g. red21). Take a sequence of shades going from red to yellow. If one thinks that the red patches look red (as opposed simply to determinate shades of red), I will argue that one is committed to two implausible conclusions about what happens when your eyes scan this sequence: one, that there is variation in the level of vagueness of how things look; two, that there is variation in the level of vagueness of whether the shades are the way they look. I will extend the argument to show that objects do not look to be tables, or to be watches, or look expensive or hot or old. What ways do I think objects look? I shall suggest that objects look determinate shades of colour, determinate sizes, determinate shapes, at determinate positions.

Location: Oxford Philosophy Department

Event Date: Jul 8, 2004

Organization: Ockham Society

I gave this paper at the Columbia/NYU Graduate Conference in 2004. In the paper I defend a sparse view of what properties experience represents. The ideas in this paper were modified quite significantly, and ended up ... more abstractI gave this paper at the Columbia/NYU Graduate Conference in 2004. In the paper I defend a sparse view of what properties experience represents. The ideas in this paper were modified quite significantly, and ended up in Chapter 1 of my thesis, which is available on my papers page.

Location: Columbia/NYU Graduate Conference

Event Date: Mar 15, 2004

This was a reply to Jerry Fodor's talk 'Having Concepts: A Brief Refutation of Practically Everything', given at the 2002 Oxford Graduate Conference in Philosophy. Fodor's paper is available here: http://www.black... more abstractThis was a reply to Jerry Fodor's talk 'Having Concepts: A Brief Refutation of Practically Everything', given at the 2002 Oxford Graduate Conference in Philosophy. Fodor's paper is available here: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00245.x?cookieSet=1&journalCode=mila

Location: Oxford Philosophy Department

Event Date: Nov 11, 2002

Organization: 2002 Oxford Philosophy Graduate Conference