Aspect-Switching and Visual Phenomenal Character

Published in Philosophical Quarterly July 2009

John Searle and Susanna Siegel have argued that cases of aspect-switching show that visual experience represents a richer range of properties than colours, shapes, positions and sizes. I argue that cases of aspect-switching can be explained without holding that visual experience represents rich properties. I also provide an argument that, even if Searle and Siegel are right, and aspect-switching does require visual experience to represent rich properties, there is reason to think those properties do not include natural kind properties, such as being a tomato.

Content Ascriptions and the Reversibility Constraint

Published in Philosophical Perspectives, volume 19 (1), Blackwell, 2005, 353-374

Thesis Abstract

Introduction: Historical and Contemporary Views On The Visible/Non-Visible Distinction, and What the Visible/Non-Visible Distinction Is Not

This is the introduction of my thesis. I discuss the ways in which past and contemporary philosophers have approached the question of the visible/non-visible distinction. I also discuss some distinctions which are similar to, but distinct from, the visible/non-visible distinction.

Chapter 1 - A Sparse View About The Properties That Objects Phenomenally Look To Have

Chapter 2 - The Tension Between Exportation And The View That Objects Phenomenally Look To The Left And Right Of Me

This is an updated version of my paper 'Content Ascriptions and the Reversibility Constraint'. I argue that there is a tension between the fact that singular terms are exportable from within the scope of mental state ascriptions, and the view that objects phenomenally look to the left and right of me.

Chapter 3 - Two More Arguments Against The View that Objects Phenomenally Look To The Left and Right Of Me, And Arguments Against Some Other Views About Phenomenal Position Properties

In this chapter, I offer some further arguments that the position properties that objects phenomenally look to us to have are not observer-relative ones (i.e. are not ones such as being to the left of me, and being in front of me).

Chapter 4 - Primitivism About Phenomenal Position Properties

Chapter 5 - An Argument That Objects Phenomenally Look To Have z Coordinates

In this chapter I use a thought experiment to argue that objects could phenomenally look to have z coordinates, in addition to phenomenally looking to have x and y coordinates. I also argue that the thought experiment gives us reason to think that objects do phenomenally look to have z coordinates, in addition to phenomenally looking to have x and y coordinates.

Chapter 6 - Coarse-Grained Vision and New Kinds of Phenomenal Character

In this chapter, I consider how objects might phenomenally look to beings with more coarse-grained visual systems than us. Many hold that to such beings, objects may phenomenally look red, without phenomenally looking a particular shade of red. David Armstrong expresses this intuition as follows: ‘It is perfectly possible… to have a mental image of a piece of crimson cloth of no particular shade of crimson.’ In this chapter I try to make intuitions of the kind that Armstrong has precise, and I try to make some progress towards evaluating them.

The Ways Things Look

This is the whole of my thesis.

Bibliography

This is the bibliography for my thesis.

Tips On How To Write Philosophy Essays

This is a short piece that I wrote for my students, outlining some tips on how to write philosophy essays.