Chapter 3
    
    Two More Arguments Against The View that Objects Phenomenally Look To The Left and Right Of Me, And Arguments Against Some Other Views About Phenomenal Position Properties
    
    Let us call the position properties that objects phenomenally look to have phenomenal position properties. In the last chapter I argued that phenomenal position properties are not observer-relative position properties. In section 1 of this chapter, I offer some further arguments for this conclusion, and in section 2 I present some arguments against some other conceptions of phenomenal position properties.
    
    Many of my arguments against the observer-relative view have the following form. I argue that the observer-relative view entails that whether objects are where they phenomenally look to be depends on the wrong kinds of facts. That is, the observer-relative view entails, for some reason R, that R is a reason for thinking that objects are not where they phenomenally look to be, when, intuitively, R is not a reason for thinking that objects are not where they phenomenally look to be.
    
    In chapter 4 I defend the view that, necessarily, objects do not have the position properties that they phenomenally look to have. However, there are good and bad reasons for thinking that objects are not where they phenomenally look to be. Suppose that R1 is a reason for thinking that objects are not where they phenomenally look to be, and R2 is not a reason for thinking that objects are not where they phenomenally look to be. If a view V entails that R2 is a reason for thinking that objects are not where they phenomenally look to be, then one can reject V, even if one holds, because of R1, that objects are not where they phenomenally look to be.
    
    1
    
    The Observer-Relative View Of Phenomenal Position Properties
    
    1.1
    
    The Problem of the Second Relatum
    
    In the last chapter our working definition of the observer-relative view was this:
    
    Observer-Relative View:
    
    Phenomenal position properties are relations to observers; that is, objects phenomenally look to bear spatial relations to observers.
    
    For instance, a defender of the observer-relative view may say that a particular object phenomenally looks to S to be to the left of S, or to be at some angle from S.
    
    In this section I discuss how plausible it is that objects phenomenally look to bear relations to the observer, as opposed to certain aspects of the observer, such as the observer’s
    
    head or eyes. The question I discuss is what the most plausible value of x is in the claim that objects phenomenally look to observers to bear a relation to x. I call this the problem of the second relatum.
    
    I raise a problem for the observer-relative view as defined above, on which the second relatum is the observer, and I argue that the only way of avoiding this problem is to amend the observer-relative view so that the second relatum is the observer’s pupils. However, I argue that a different kind of problem arises for the amended view. Thus both the original observer-relative view and the amended observer-relative view face problems.
    
    Suppose that, at t1, a cup is on my right, and the proponent of the observer-relative view says that the cup phenomenally looks to the right of me. Figure 1 represents this situation from a bird’s eye perspective. Arrows next to terms indicate the directions in which the referents of those terms are pointing.
    
    Figure 1
    
    t1
    
    cup
    
    eyes nose head
    
    body
    
    Suppose that, at t2, I rotate my body to the right by forty degrees, so that my body faces the cup, but I keep my head facing in the same direction as it was facing in at t1; my head is no longer perpendicular to my body. This is illustrated in figure 2: Figure 2
    
    t2
    
    cup
    
    eyes nose head
    
    body
    
    Assuming that I do not see my body, it seems very plausible that there will be no visual phenomenal difference between the way that the cup looks to me at t1 and the way it looks to me at t2; after all, my head is pointing in the same direction at both times, and the visible scene has not changed. There may well be a proprioceptive phenomenal difference between t1 and t2,
    
    owing to the angle that my body bears to my head being different at the two times, but intuitively this proprioceptive phenomenal difference is not a visual phenomenal difference. So that we may focus on what purely visual phenomenal differences there are, let us suppose that one’s proprioceptive sense has been numbed.
    
    According to the phenomenal character principle developed in chapter 1, if there is no visual phenomenal difference between the way the cup looks at t1 and t2, then if the cup phenomenally looks to my right at t1, it phenomenally looks to my right at t2 as well. Since the cup is straight ahead of me at t2, the proponent of the observer-relative view is committed to saying that, at t2, I am having an illusion: the cup is not where it phenomenally looks to me to be.
    
    This seems an implausible consequence. It seems implausible that objects are where they phenomenally look to be only when one’s head is perpendicular to one’s body.
    
    This consequence can be avoided if we amend the observer-relative view so that the second relatum is the observer’s head, rather than the observer: so, according to the amended observer-relative view, at t1, the cup phenomenally looks to the right of my head. This solves the problem mentioned in the paragraph above. When, at t2, I rotate my body to the right by forty degrees, but keep my head facing in the same direction as it was facing in at t1, the cup remains to the right of my head. Thus, if we say that the cup phenomenally looks to the right of my head at t1 and t2, we can say that at both t1 and t2 it is where it phenomenally looks to be; so no illusion occurs.
    
    However, the same problem arises in a different form for the observer-relative view when we consider the possible movement of my eyes. Let us suppose that at t3, I rotate my head to the right by forty degrees, so now it is facing in the same direction as my body, but I keep my eyes facing in the same direction as they were facing in at t2 and t1, so my eyes are facing in a different direction from my head. This is illustrated in figure 3. Figure 3
    
    t3
    
    cup
    
    eyes head
    
    body
    
    The situation now is that the cup is straight ahead of my head, and it is to the right of my eyes, since my eyes are facing in the same direction as they were at t1, and the cup was to the right of my eyes at t1. If we assume that I do not see my nose, then it seems that there will be no visual phenomenal difference between the way the cup looks at t2 and t3. In normal circumstances, there would be a proprioceptive phenomenal difference between t2 and t3, but in the example we are supposing that my proprioceptive sense is numbed.
    
    Given that there is no visual phenomenal difference between the way the cup looks at t2 and t3, if the cup phenomenally looks to the right of my head at t2, then it phenomenally looks to
    
    the right of my head at t3. However, the cup is straight ahead of my head at t3, and so it follows that I am having an illusion: the cup is not where it phenomenally looks to be.
    
    This seems an implausible consequence; it seems odd to say that objects are where they phenomenally look to be only when one’s eyes are facing in the same direction as one’s head.
    
    One can avoid the objection by amending the observer-relative view so that the instead of the observer’s head being the second relatum, the observer’s eyes are the second and third relata. Therefore, in the example above, the cup phenomenally looks to the right of my eyes, and since it is to the right of my eyes from t1 to t3, the cup is where it phenomenally looks to be from t1 to t3.
    
    However, we can now consider a fourth possible moving part: one’s pupils. Although one’s pupils cannot in fact move independently of one’s eyes, it seems that they could have done. Consider the following world, w1:
    
    w1:
    
    A world which is identical in all respects to the actual world, except that, in w1,
    
    our pupils can move independently of our eyes.
    
    So, the events that occur in w1 between t1 to t3 are the same as the events that occur between those times in the actual world.
    
    Suppose that, at t4, I move my eyes forty degrees to the right so that the cup is straight ahead of my eyes, but I keep my pupils facing in the same direction as they were facing in from t1 to t3. This is illustrated in figure 4.
    
    Figure 4
    
    t4
    
    cup pupils
    
    eyes head
    
    body
    
    It seems that there need be no visual phenomenal difference between the way the cup phenomenally looks at t3 and t4. Or course, our eyes could be so constructed so that there is a visual phenomenal difference, but they need not be. If we say that the cup phenomenally looks to the right of my eyes at t3, then it phenomenally looks to the right of my eyes at t4. Since the cup is not to the right of my eyes at t4, it follows that the cup is not where it phenomenally looks to be. Hence an illusion is occurring. However, it seems odd to say that, in otherwise normal circumstances, objects are where they phenomenally look to be only when one’s pupils are facing in the same direction as one’s eyes. It seems just as odd to say this as it does to say that objects are where they phenomenally look to be only when the direction of one’s head is perpendicular to one’s body.
    
    To avoid this, we should amend the observer-relative view so that the second and third relata are the observer’s pupils, rather than the observer’s eyes. Thus, a proponent of the observer-relative view will say that the cup phenomenally looks to the right of my pupils from t1 to t4. Since the cup is to the right of my pupils from t1 to t4, no illusion occurs.
    
    However, this formulation of the observer-relative view now faces a different objection. Situation S1 is as follows:
    
    S1:
    
    A normal situation in which we are looking at a cup that is straight ahead, and our eyes are facing the cup.
    
    Consider the world w2:
    
    w2:
    
    A world in which, for objects phenomenally to look to us the way they do in S1 in the actual world, our eyes need to be angled twenty degrees to the right, rather than facing straight ahead, as they are in the actual world.
    
    To make w2 vivid, we can assume that in w2 our pupils have photo-sensitive cells on the sides of our pupils.
    
    Suppose that, in the actual world, a cup is positioned straight ahead of me, such that a proponent of the amended observer-relative view would say that the cup phenomenally looks
    
    straight ahead of my pupils. In w2, the cup is positioned straight ahead of me, and my pupils are angled at twenty degrees to the right. Given how our eyes work in w2, the cup phenomenally looks the same to me in w2 as it does in the actual world. That is, there is no visual phenomenal difference between the way the cup phenomenally looks to me in w2, and the way it phenomenally looks to me in the actual world.
    
    It follows from the phenomenal character principle that if the cup phenomenally looks straight ahead of my pupils in the actual world, it phenomenally looks straight ahead of my pupils in w2. However, since the cup is not straight ahead of my pupils in w2, but rather to the left of my pupils, given that my pupils are angled to the right in w2, then the cup is not where it phenomenally looks to be in w2.
    
    However, this seems an implausible consequence. If there is an illusion occurring in one of the actual world and w2, there does not seem any reason why it should be occurring in w2. The inhabitants of w2 have as much right to say that the illusion is occurring in the actual world as we have right to say that the illusion is occurring in w2. The observer-relative view is committed to the view that the inhabitants of one of these two worlds are having illusions, while the inhabitants of the other world are not, and this seems an implausible commitment.
    
    The original formulation of the observer-relative view was that objects phenomenally look to bear spatial relations to the observer, and the final formulation of the observer-relative view was that objects phenomenally look to bear relations to the observer’s pupils. The aim of this section has been to show that both formulations of the observer-relative view face problems.
    
    1.2
    
    The Functionality of Front and Back and Top and Bottom
    
    Intuitively, the right/left distinction is dependent on the front/back distinction and the top/bottom distinction. If an object has neither a front nor a back, then it has neither a right nor a left; and if an object has neither a top nor a bottom, then it has neither a right nor a left. For instance, a perfectly homogeneous sphere has neither a front nor a back, nor a top nor a bottom; consequently it has neither a right nor a left. Even if the sphere had a front and a back, if it had neither a top nor a bottom, then it would have neither a right nor a left.
    
    1.2.1 Front and Back
    
    It seems that the concept of the front of an object is a functional one; an object’s having a front is a matter of one of the sides of the object’s having a certain functional role. That an object has a front or a back is not intrinsic to that object. For instance, a chair has a front and a back; and yet we can imagine a world in which intrinsic duplicates of chairs do not have fronts and backs. For instance, in a world in which intrinsic duplicates of chairs are plants, and these plants are not used in any particular way, then it seems these duplicates of chairs have neither fronts nor backs.
    
    By altering the functions of an object, it seems possible to turn an object that has a front and a back into an object that does not have a front and a back. For instance, we are inclined to
    
    say that a microwave has a front and a back; the front is the side with the door and the dials on. However, if we put a television screen on the back of the microwave, so that the same object can be used to watch television on and to cook with, then we would be inclined to say that the object no longer has a front nor a back. There would be no basis for deciding which side the front of the object was and which side the back was.
    
    It seems that this process of changing an object so that it has neither a front nor a back could be applied to a human being. The functionality of a human being happens to be heavily dominated by one of its sides. Its eyes, mouth, nose are all on the same side of its body, and its arms and legs naturally move in the direction that this side faces. Suppose that these functions were more evenly distributed on two sides of the human body. For instance, suppose that the mouth was on the actual back of the head, and a human’s legs naturally worked in the direction that the actual back of the human body faces. We may suppose that, in other respects, the human body is the same as it actually is. This is illustrated in figure 5:
    
    Figure 5
    
    Eyes Mouth nose
    
    Direction of movement of arms
    
    Direction of movement of legs
    
    It seems that we would say that a being of the kind illustrated in figure 5 would have neither a front nor a back; it is not obvious on what basis we would decide which side is the front and which side is the back. Given that the right/left distinction is based on the front/back distinction, it follows that a being of the above kind would have neither a right nor a left. Let us call such a being a front-and-backless being.
    
    Now, let us suppose that a subject, S, turns, between t1 and t2, from being a normal human being into a front-and-backless being. Let us suppose that, all along, S is looking at an apple, which, at t1, is to its right. According to the original formulation of the observer-relative view, at t1, the apple phenomenally looks to S to be to S’s right. There is no visual phenomenal difference between the ways that objects phenomenally look to S between t1 and t2, so it follows, on the original observer-relative view, that, at t2, the apple phenomenally looks to the right of S.
    
    However, at t2, S has neither a front nor a back, and therefore neither a right nor a left. It follows that the apple is not where it phenomenally looks to S to be, and so S is having an illusion. This seems implausible. Consider the following world, w3:
    
    w3:
    
    A world in which all beings are originally formed like S is at t2, and therefore are front-and-backless.
    
    Call the beings in w3 originally front-and-backless beings. Suppose that objects phenomenally look the same to these beings as they do to S at t2. It seems implausible to say that the beings in w3 have illusions about where objects phenomenally look to them to be.
    
    One way of responding to the above argument is to hold that terms such as ‘right’ and ‘left’ are rigid designators. According to this view, certain descriptions are used to fix the reference of ‘right’ and ‘left’, but these descriptions are not part of the meaning of ‘right’ and ‘left’ (for a defence of this view, see Pooley 2002). Call this the rigid view. Above we argued that, intuitively, the right/left distinction is dependent on the front/back distinction. That is, an object without a front or back intuitively does not have a right and left. If we are to keep this connection between the notions of front and back and the notions of right and left, then it should be part of the rigid view that ‘front’ and ‘back’ are rigid designators. Consider a world, w4, which is as follows:
    
    w4:
    
    A world just like the actual world, except that our legs and arms naturally move in the actual backwards direction, and all the features characteristic of our actual
    
    front sides are on our actual back sides, and all the features characteristic of our actual back sides are on our actual front sides.
    
    In w4, according to the rigid view, we walk backwards. This seems a counter-intuitive part of the rigid view. It seems more natural to say that, in w4, we walk forwards, and the side that, in w4, the expression ‘my front’ picks out is different from the side that, in the actual world, ‘my front’ picks out. Nevertheless, I shall consider how the rigid view affects the above argument.
    
    If the rigid view is correct, then if S has a right side and a left side at t1, then S also has a right side and a left side at t2. However, the rigid view is consistent with the possibility of originally front-and-backless beings, as they were described above, who would have neither right nor left sides. After all, the rigid view allows that descriptions are used to fix the references of terms such as ‘right’ and ‘left’. Thus, if such descriptions do not pick out any sides, as, intuitively, they would not in the case of originally front-and-backless beings, then terms such as ‘right’ and ‘left’ would not refer.
    
    The argument above was that the observer-relative view has two implausible consequences: the first is that it provides a reason for thinking that, at t2, S is having an illusion; the second is that it provides a reason to think that originally front-and-backless beings suffer illusions. If the rigid view is correct, then the observer-relative view does not have the first consequence, but it does still have the second consequence.
    
    In what follows I will be assuming that the rigid view is false. I will be appealing to temporal as well as modal differences in the right and left sides of beings. The rigid view is not consistent with either of these kinds of differences. However, there is a way of amending the modal arguments below to render them consistent with the rigid view. When I write that an object which actually has a front and a back might have been originally front-and-backless, we can rephrase the envisaged possibility as being that there might have been an originally frontand-backless being. Nothing in the arguments below depends on the over-time or cross-world identity of the originally front-and-backless being with some object which does have a front and a back.
    
    A second way in which a proponent of the observer-relative view could respond to the above argument is by holding that the apple phenomenally looks to S to the right of S’s pupils at t1 and t2, and, at least in the above example, S’s pupils do, plausibly, have a front and a back, and therefore a right and a left. However, we can apply the same procedure to S’s pupils that we applied to S’s body: we can ensure that S’s eyes do not have a front and a back by assigning an important function to the back of S’s pupils in such a way that we have no basis for deciding which side of S’s pupils is the back, and which side is the front.
    
    One slightly far-fetched, but nonetheless possible, example is the following. Suppose that S’s head was a ring with a hole in the middle, and in the hole was a round object containing a pupil. Through one end of the pupil light comes in, enabling S to see; through the other end, air comes in, enabling S to smell. We can assume that air can only enter this end of the pupil owing to there being a lens at the other end of the pupil. Thus the pupil has two functions, and different
    
    ends of the pupil are responsible for each of the two functions. A vertical cross-section of S, viewed from the side, is illustrated in figure 6.
    
    Figure 6
    S’s head S’s eye Light into S’s pupil S’s pupil Air into S’s pupil
    
    In figure 6, it does not seem that S’s pupil has a front and a back; after all, it is not clear on what basis we could decide which end the front of the pupil was, and which end the back of the pupil was. Let us specify world w5 as follows:
    
    w5:
    
    A world in which S is as figure 6 illustrates her to be.
    
    Let us suppose that, at t2 in w5, S is looking at an apple as she is in the actual world at t2. There need be no visual phenomenal difference between the way the apple phenomenally looks to S at t2 in the actual world, and the way the apple phenomenally looks to S at t2 in w5. If the apple phenomenally looks to the right of S’s pupils at t2 in the actual world, it follows from the phenomenal character principle that the apple phenomenally looks to the right of S’s pupils at t2 in w5. Since S’s pupils at t2 in w5 have neither a right nor a left, then S is having an illusion in w5. This seems to be an unattractive consequence of the observer-relative view.
    
    Thus, the functionality of the notions of front and back seems to pose a problem for the observer-relative view. The crux of the problem is that one can change those functions of a given human being that are relevant to determining which side is the front, and which side is the back, without changing how things phenomenally look to that human being. There is no necessary connection between these functions and the way things phenomenally look to the human being. Thus cases arise in which the observer-relative view is committed to saying that an object phenomenally looks to S to be to the right of S (or a part of S) even when S (or the relevant part of S) has no right or left.
    
    1.2.2 Top and Bottom
    
    A similar problem arises when one considers the notions of top and bottom. Consider the following world, w6:
    
    w6:
    
    A world in which our normal posture is a handstand. In this world it is normal for us to live standing on our hands, and to walk by moving our arms, much as we walk by moving our legs in the actual world.
    
    Because the handstand is the normal posture for us in w6, it seems that our tops and bottoms in w6 are different from our tops and bottoms in the actual world. Whilst in the actual world, the bottoms of our bodies are the ends with our legs on, and the tops of our bodies are the ends with our heads on, in w6 the situation seems to be reversed. In w6 it seems that the bottoms of our bodies are the ends with our arms and heads on, and the tops of our bodies are the ends
    
    with our legs on. Thus, our top in the actual world is our bottom in w6, and our bottom in the actual world is our top in w6. As suggested above, if one held the rigid view, then one should consider a world just like w6, except that the beings in question are distinct from us.
    
    Let us assume that the sides of me that are my front and back are the same in w6 and the actual world. Nonetheless, since the ends of me that are my top and bottom are different in w6 and the actual world, the sides of me that are my right and left are different in w6 and in the actual world. For instance, in the actual world my heart is on my left, whereas in w6 my heart is on my right.
    
    w6 creates a problem for the observer-relative view. Suppose that, at t1 in the actual world, I am looking at a cup to my right, and, according to the observer-relative view, the cup phenomenally looks to the right of me (or to the right of a part of me; it will not matter which for the purposes of the argument). Then at t2 that I do a hand-stand, bearing the same angle to the cup as I did at t1. The states of affairs at t1 and t2 in the actual world are illustrated in figures 7 and 8:
    
    Figure 7
    
    t1 in the actual world
    
    cup
    
    eyes nose head
    
    My left
    
    body
    
    My right
    
    Figure 8
    
    The following is a birds-eye view of the handstand. t2 in the actual world
    cup
    
    Eyes, head Soles of feet My right Body
    
    Upside down body
    
    My left
    
    Since my hand-stand, illustrated in figure 8, is only a temporary posture, and not my normal one, it does not seem that, at t2, my legs have become the top of my body and my head has become the bottom. Rather it seems that, when doing the handstand, my legs remain at the bottom of my body, and my head remains at the top of my body. It is only when a handstand posture is the norm for a population that there is pressure to say that the legs are at the tops of the bodies in that population, and the heads are at the bottoms of the bodies in that population. Given that the ends that are my top and bottom do not change when I temporarily do a handstand, it does not seem that the sides that are my right and my left change when I temporarily do a handstand. Intuitively, my heart remains on the left-hand side of me even when I temporarily do a handstand.
    
    Because I am upside down at t2, the proponent of the observer-relative view will say that the cup phenomenally looks to my left at t2; and since it is to my left at t2, it is where it phenomenally looks to be. However, suppose that I am in w6, that I am standing on my head, being supported by my arms, looking at the cup, and that I bear the same relation to it as I do in the actual world. In other words, the situation is exactly the same as in figure 8, except there is one difference: my right and left have switched around. This is because my top and bottom are different in w6 from my top and bottom in the actual world, and so my right and left are different in w6 from my right and left in the actual world. When I am looking at the cup at t2 in w6, the cup will be to the right of me, whereas when I am looking at the cup at t2 in the actual world, the cup is to the left of me. This is illustrated in figure 9. Figure 9 is identical to figure 8 except that the arrow pointing to my left in figure 8 points to my right in figure 9, and the arrow that points to my right in figure 8 points to my left in figure 9.
    
    Figure 9
    
    t2 in w6
    
    cup
    
    Eyes, head Soles of feet My left Body
    
    Upside down body
    
    My right
    
    There need be no visual phenomenal difference between the way the cup looks to me at t2 in the actual world, and the way it looks to me at t2 in w6. It follows from the phenomenal character principle that if the cup phenomenally looks to the left of me at t2 in the actual world, it phenomenally looks to the left of me at t2 in w6. Since it is not to the left of me at t2 in w6, the cup is not where it phenomenally looks to be. This seems an implausible consequence, since I, in w6, seem to have as much reason to say that I, in the actual world, am the one having an illusion, rather than vice versa.
    
    One can consider a temporal version of this objection, where worlds are replaced by times. At t2, when I am doing a handstand, the top of my body is touching the ground, so the cup is to the left of me. Between t2 and t10, it becomes normal for me to assume the handstand posture, and thus my top and bottom at t10 are different from my top and bottom at t2. Thus, in this temporal version of the objection, figure 8 can be used to illustrate the state of affairs at t2, and figure 9 can be used to illustrate the state of affairs at t10. The rest of the argument is the
    
    same as above: if the cup phenomenally looks to me to be to my left at t2, then it phenomenally looks to me to be to my left at t10. Since the cup is not to my left at t10, the cup is not where it phenomenally looks to be at t10, which is an unattractive consequence of the observer-relative view.
    
    A proponent of the observer-relative view might object to this temporal argument by pointing to psychological evidence which suggests that after a subject wears up/down inverting lenses for a certain amount of time, perceived objects phenomenally look to the subject to have the orientation that they phenomenally looked to the subject to have before the subject starting wearing the inverting lenses; that is, that inverting lenses have only a short-lived effect. If this was correct, then we cannot assume that there would be no visual phenomenal difference between the way that objects phenomenally look at t2 and at t10. As it turns out, this psychological evidence is unclear (see O’Regan and Noe 2001). However, if it does turn out to the be the case that inverting lenses have only a short-lived effect, then the temporal argument would have to be rejected. The modal argument would be unaffected, however, as the psychological evidence in question only concerns what happens in the actual world. The evidence does not suggest that a world such as w6 is not possible, and all that is required for the modal argument above is that w6 is possible.
    
    A proponent of the observer-relative view may reply to the modal argument as follows. They may argue that, when I am upside-down at t2 in the actual world, as illustrated in figure 8, the cup does not phenomenally look to my left, despite the fact that it is to my left. They may argue that, in fact, the cup phenomenally looks to my right at t2 in the actual world, and therefore
    
    I am having an illusion. The motivation for this reply is as follows: since there is no visual phenomenal difference between how things phenomenally look at t2 in the actual world and at t2 in w6, i.e. the situations illustrated in figures 8 and 9 respectively, if the proponent of the observer-relative view can say that the cup phenomenally looks to my right at t2 in the actual world, then he can say that the cup phenomenally looks to my right at t2 in w6. The background assumption to the reply is that, given that the observer-relative view is committed to there being an illusion in either the actual world or w6 at t2, it is better that the illusion occur in the actual world, since at least I am assuming an abnormal posture at t2 in the actual world, and this latter fact can be used to reduce the implausibility of holding that an illusion is occurring.
    
    However, this reply is not likely to work, since there is pressure on the proponent of the observer-relative view to say that, at t2 in the actual world, in the situation illustrated in figure 8, the cup does phenomenally look to my left. This is because there is no visual phenomenal difference between the way the cup phenomenally looks to me at t2 in the actual world and the way the cup phenomenally looks to me in a situation which is as good a candidate as any to be described as one in which the cup phenomenally looks to my left. This situation will be described below. The situation described below is envisaged as occurring in the actual world.
    
    At t1, I am looking at the cup, which is to my right. The situation is illustrated in figure 7. Suppose that t3 is just like t1, except that the scene that I am viewing has been rotated by 180 degrees around a central point. The rotation affects only the objects I see; I stay upright at my normal orientation. The situation at t3 is illustrated in figure 10.
    
    Figure 10
    
    t3
    Cup (part of the visible scene which has been rotated around a central point)
    
    eyes nose head
    
    My left
    
    body
    
    My right
    
    Recall the descriptions of t1, t2 and t3 in the actual world:
    
    t1 in the actual world:
    
    A normal situation in which I am looking at a cup, which is to my right, illustrated in figure 7.
    
    t2 in the actual world:
    
    The same situation as at t1, except that I am doing a handstand, illustrated in figure 8.
    
    t3 in the actual world:
    
    The same situation as at t1, except that the visible scene has been rotated by 180 degrees around a central point, illustrated in figure 10. I have the posture I have at t1, and am thus not doing a handstand.
    
    It will be easy to find the right point around which the scene is rotated by 180 degrees such that there is no visual phenomenal difference between the way the cup phenomenally looks to me at t3, and the way the cup phenomenally looks to me at t2. At both t2 and t3 it would be natural to describe things as looking upside down. Admittedly, there will be a proprioceptive phenomenal difference between the situation at t3 and the situation at t2, but as we have claimed before, this does not seem to be a visual phenomenal difference.
    
    It seems that the proponent of the observer-relative view will want to say that, at t3, the cup phenomenally looks to my left. Given that there is no visual phenomenal difference between the way the cup phenomenally looks at t3 and the way it phenomenally looks at t2, the proponent of the observer-relative view is committed to saying that the cup phenomenally looks to my left at t2 in the actual world.
    
    As with the objection concerning the notions of front and back, the crux of the objection concerning the notions of top and bottom is that one can change the factors that determine which ends of a being are its top and bottom, and therefore which sides of the being are its left and right, without changing how things phenomenally look to that being. Thus cases arise in which the observer-relative view is committed to saying of two apparently symmetrical cases that one involves an illusion and the other does not, and this is an implausible consequence of the observer-relative view.
    
    1.3
    
    Visual Angles
    
    In this section I shall discuss another observer-relative view, the visual angle view:
    
    Visual Angle View: Phenomenal position properties are angles from the observer.
    
    We often say that one line looks at a certain angle from another line. For instance, in figure 11 below, we may say that line A looks at 90 degrees from line B. For the sake of argument, I will assume that the looking involved here is phenomenal looking.
    
    Figure 11
    
    A
    
    B
    
    According to the visual angle view, a given object, say a cup, may phenomenally look to be at 150 degrees from the subject, S. However, there is a question about what it means to say that the cup phenomenally looks at a certain angle from S. Similarly, there is a question about what it means to say that the cup is at a certain angle from S. Lines and planes bear angles to each other, not items such as the cup and S.
    
    When a proponent of the visual angle view says that a given cup phenomenally looks to be at 150 degrees from the subject, one interpretation of this claim is that the line connecting the cup with the bridge of S’s nose phenomenally looks at a certain angle from the line that originates at the bridge of S’s nose and goes off straight to S’s left; i.e. a line that is tangential to the bridge of S’s nose. Let us call the bridge of S’s nose B, and let us call this interpretation of the visual angle view the pretheoretic interpretation:
    
    The Pretheoretic Interpretation:
    
    ‘O phenomenally looks to be at 150 degrees from S’ is true iff the line connecting O and B phenomenally looks to S to be at 150 degrees from the line that originates at B and goes off straight to S’s left.
    
    The pretheoretic interpretation of the visual angle view is illustrated below in figure 12. Line L2 is the line connecting the bridge of S’s nose with the cup, and line L1 is the line originating at the bridge of S’s nose and going off straight to the left.
    
    Figure 12
    
    cup 150˚
    
    L2
    
    L1
    
    head eyes
    
    My left
    
    body Bridge of nose (B)
    
    My right
    
    In this section I will argue that the pretheoretic interpretation of the visual angle view faces a difficulty. There is an alternative interpretation of the visual angle view that avoids the difficulty, but I will argue that this alternative interpretation faces a separate problem.
    
    In figure 11 above, what angle A phenomenally looks to bear to B depends on what perspective one is viewing the lines from. For instance, consider the point where line A meets line B; call this point X. Consider the arc that starts 10cm above X and finishes 10cm below it. 0 degrees on the arc is the beginning of the arc 10cm above X. One’s perspective on the angle between A and B can be from different angles on this arc. If one’s perspective on the angle is from 90 degrees on the arc, i.e. directly above X, then A phenomenally looks to bear an angle of 90 degrees to B. If one’s perspective on the angle is from 150 degrees on the arc, then A phenomenally looks to bear a much wider angle to B. If one’s perspective on the angle is from 180 degrees on the arc, then A phenomenally looks to bear an angle of 180 degrees to B. That is, A and B phenomenally look to be a straight line. Another way of putting this is that if S is looking at lines A and B from the side, rather than from above, then they will phenomenally look to bear an angle of 180 degrees to each other.
    
    According to the pretheoretic interpretation of the visual angle view, L2 phenomenally looks to S to be at 150 degrees from L1. However, there is a problem with this claim. The problem is that S’s perspective on lines L1 and L2 is from the side, rather than from above. As we saw in the case of figure 11, if one’s perspective on two lines is from the side, then they will phenomenally look to be at 180 degrees from each other. Thus L1 and L2 phenomenally look to be at 180 degrees to each other. It is only if S’s perspective on L1 and L2 was from directly above that L1 and L2 would phenomenally look to be at 150 degrees from each other.
    
    To make this vivid, we can suppose that L1 and L2 are black rods. If S is viewing these rods from the side, then they will phenomenally look to bear 180 degrees to each other, whatever angle they in fact bear to each other.
    
    There is an alternative interpretation of the visual angle view which avoids the above problem. Let us call this the propositional property interpretation of the visual angle view.
    
    The Propositional Property Interpretation: ‘O phenomenally looks to be at 150 degrees from S’ is true iff there exists a property of being such that the line that connects O and B is 150 degrees from the line that originates at B and goes off straight to S’s left, and O phenomenally looks to have this property.
    
    In chapter 1 we drew the distinction between propositional properties and nonpropositional properties. A propositional property is, for some p, the property of being such that p is true. A non-propositional property is a property that is not a propositional property.
    
    According to the pretheoretic interpretation of the visual angle view, objects phenomenally look to have non-propositional properties. According to the propositional property interpretation of the visual angle view, objects phenomenally look to have propositional properties, such as the property of being such that the line that connects O and B is 150 degrees from the line that originates at B and goes off straight to S’s left.
    
    In chapter 1 we argued that phenomenal looking is a relation between two objects and a non-propositional property. The argument was as follows. I will first give the argument using colour properties, and then give the argument using position properties. Suppose that phenomenal looking is a relation between two objects and a propositional property. Suppose that the conditions are normal, that A is red, and that B is green, and that A phenomenally looks such that A is red, and that B phenomenally looks such B is green. It seems intuitive that A is not the way that B phenomenally looks in respect of colour. However, if ‘the way that B phenomenally looks in respect of colour’ refers to the property of being such that B is green, then A is the way that B phenomenally looks in respect of colour, since A is such that B is green. If, on the other hand, ‘the way that B phenomenally looks in respect of colour’ refers to the property of being green, then it does follow, as intuitively it ought to, that A is not the way B phenomenally looks in respect of colour.
    
    Suppose that the propositional property interpretation of the visual angle view is correct. Assuming that B is the bridge of my nose, suppose that object O1 phenomenally looks such that the line connecting O1 and B is 150 degrees from the line that originates at B and goes off to my left. And suppose that O2 phenomenally looks such that the line connecting O2 and B is 100 degrees from the line that originates at B and goes off to my left. This situation is illustrated in figure 13. Figure 13
    150˚ 100˚
    
    O2 O1
    
    head eyes
    
    My left
    
    body Bridge of nose (B)
    
    My right
    
    O1 and O2 phenomenally look to have different positions. Suppose that O1 is the way it phenomenally looks in respect of position, and that O2 is the way it phenomenally looks in respect of position. It seems we want to say that O1 is not the way that O2 phenomenally looks in respect of position. However, if ‘the way that O2 phenomenally looks in respect of position’ refers to the property of being such that the line connecting O2 and B is 100 degrees from the line that originates at B and goes off to my left, then O1 will be the way that O2 phenomenally looks in respect of position. After all, O1 is such that the line connecting O2 and B is 100 degrees from the line that originates at B and goes off to my left.
    
    Thus, if the argument that we developed in chapter 1 against the view that phenomenal looking is a relation between two objects and a propositional property is sound, then we should reject the propositional interpretation of the visual angle view.
    
    2
    
    Other Views About Phenomenal Position Properties
    
    All of the views considered so far have been varieties of the observer-relative view. They have thus all been inconsistent with the phenomenal looking exportation principle developed in chapter 2, which entails that if x phenomenally looks to S to bear R to S, then S sees S, and if x phenomenally looks such that y bears R to S, then S sees S. In this section I discuss some nonobserver-relative views about the nature of phenomenal position properties. With the exception of the Leibnizian relationalist view, the views below are consistent with the phenomenal looking exportation principle.
    
    2.1
    
    Field-Of-View Relationalism
    
    According to the field-of-view relationalism, the position properties that objects phenomenally look to have are relations between the perceived objects. For instance, suppose that one is looking at the following sequence of letters:
    
    A
    
    B
    
    C
    
    The field-of-view relationalist will say that the position properties that A, B and C phenomenally look to have are spatial relations between them, for instance, the relations of B being halfway between A and C, A being twice as far from C as it is from B, C being twice as far from A as it is from B, and so on. The relations in question are restricted to non-observer-relative ones, since field-of-view relationalism is designed to be consistent with the phenomenal looking exportation principle. Thus, the relations do not include relations such as being to the left of, since A’s being to the left of B is a matter of A’s being further to the left of the perceiving subject than B.
    
    One immediate problem faces field-of-view relationalism. Suppose that one is simply looking at one object alone, say a kite against a blue sky. Intuitively, if the kite moves enough between t1 and t2, the position that the kite phenomenally looks to be in at t2 will be different from the position that the kite phenomenally looks to be in at t1. This situation is illustrated in figure 14. Figure 14
    
    The kite at t1
    
    The kite at t2
    
    It is not obvious how field-of-view relationalism accommodates this possibility. According to field-of-view relationalism, the position that an object phenomenally looks to have may change only if the relations that the object phenomenally looks to bear to other seen objects changes. However, in the case of the kite, the kite is the only object one sees, and therefore there are no objects to which the kite may phenomenally look to bear different relations at t1 and t2.
    
    It seems that the response which the field-of-view relationalist must make here is that the kite is not the only object that one sees. The field-of-view relationalist must say that one also sees parts of the sky. If one does see parts of the sky, then there will be a particular part of the sky to which the kite phenomenally looks closer at t2 than at t1, and therefore the field-of-view relationalist can account for the fact that the kite phenomenally looks to be in different positions at t1 and t2.
    
    A more pressing problem facing field-of-view relationalism is that it cannot accommodate the possibility that if a set of objects are inverted around some axis, then they will
    
    come phenomenally to look in different positions. Suppose that, at t1, a subject S1 is looking at a red rectangle to the left of a green rectangle, which together take up S1’s entire field of view. This situation is illustrated in figure 15.
    
    Figure 15 t1
    
    Red rectangle
    
    Green rectangle
    
    S1
    
    In describing where the two rectangles phenomenally look to S1 to be, the field-of-view relationalist cannot say that the red rectangle phenomenally looks to the left of the green rectangle, since the relation of x being to the left of y is an observer-relative relation. All that the field of view relationalist can say is that the red rectangle phenomenally looks next to the green rectangle.
    
    Suppose that the red and the green rectangles swap positions between t1 and t2. The situation at t2 is illustrated in figure 16.
    
    Figure 16
    
    t2
    
    Green rectangle
    
    Red rectangle
    
    S1
    
    According to the field-of-view relationalist, the positions that the rectangles phenomenally look to have between t1 and t2 will not change, since at t2 the red rectangle still phenomenally looks next to the green rectangle. The relations that the rectangles phenomenally look to bear to each other are the same before and after they swap positions. However it seems clear that the red and green rectangles phenomenally look in different positions at t1 and t2.
    
    The objection also applies when one considers the subject changing position. Suppose that, at t1, S1 is looking at the red and green rectangles before her. At t2, S1 walks round the rectangles and looks at them from the opposite perspective. This situation is illustrated in figure 17.
    
    Figure 17
    
    S1 at t2
    
    Red rectangle
    
    Green rectangle
    
    S1 at t1
    
    At t2, the rectangles clearly phenomenally look in different positions to S1. However, according to the field-of-view relationalist, the rectangles phenomenally look in the same position at t1 and t2, since for every relation R that the rectangles phenomenally look to bear to each other at t1, they phenomenally look to bear R to each other at t2. This example shows that it is possible for the position that an object phenomenally looks to change without the relations that
    
    the objects phenomenally looks to bear to other objects changing, and therefore that field-ofview relationalism is false.
    
    2.2
    
    Leibnizian Relational Properties
    
    One might try to avoid the problems that face field-of-view relationalism by holding that phenomenal position properties are Leibnizian relational properties, i.e. relations to every other object in the universe. When the red and green rectangle swap positions, although no relation between them changes, relations between them and other objects in the universe change. Thus, if objects phenomenally look to have Leibnizian relational properties, then it is possible to explain how the rectangles phenomenally look to be in different positions after they are swapped.
    
    Similarly, when S1 adopts the opposite perspective on the two rectangles, although the relations between the two rectangles do not change, their relations to other objects in the universe, for instance S1, change, and so the Leibnizian relationalist can account for the fact that the rectangles phenomenally look to be in different positions after S1 adopts the opposite perspective on them.
    
    However, the Leibnizian relational view is inconsistent with the phenomenal looking exportation principle, since one does not see every object in the universe, and a consequence of the phenomenal looking exportation principle is that x phenomenally looks to S to bear R to y only if S sees x an y.
    
    The Leibnizian relationalist also faces an objection similar to the one facing the field-ofview relationalist. Instead of considering a single subject adopting the opposite perspective on two rectangles, let us suppose that there are two subjects, S1 and S2, sitting opposite each other, with the red and green rectangle between them. This situation is illustrated in figure 18.
    
    Figure 18
    
    S2
    
    Red rectangle
    
    Green rectangle
    
    S1
    
    The rectangles clearly phenomenally look to have different positions to S1 and to S2, but the Leibnizian relationalist does not have the resources to account for this. Suppose that the red rectangle stands in the set of spatial relations R1 to the other objects in the universe, and suppose that the green rectangle stands in the set of spatial relations R2 to the other objects in the universe. According to the Leibnizian relationalist, the red rectangle phenomenally looks to have
    
    R1 to S1 and to S2, and the green rectangle phenomenally looks to have R2 to S1 and to S2. Thus the Leibnizian relationalist cannot accommodate the fact that the red and green rectangles phenomenally look to have different positions to S1 and S2.
    
    Let us call the above problem, as illustrated in figure 18, the perspective problem.
    
    The Perspective Problem: The problem of accounting for the fact that, in normal conditions, if there are four objects, w, x, y and z, such that: (i) (ii) (iii) w and x are side by side y and z are looking at w and x y and z have opposite perspectives on w and x
    
    then: (iv) the position that w phenomenally looks to y is different from the position that w phenomenally looks to z. (v) the position that x phenomenally looks to y is different from the position that x phenomenally looks to z.
    
    2.3
    
    Substantivalism
    
    One might take the view that a given object phenomenally looks to be in that position, where that position picks out some absolute, substantivalist location. Thus, when S1 is looking at the two rectangles, and the rectangles swap positions between t1 and t2, the substantivalist can
    
    explain the fact that they come phenomenally to look in different positions. Before they swap position, the red rectangle phenomenally looks to be in that position1, and after they swap position, the red rectangle phenomenally looks to be in that position2, and that position1 is different from that position2.
    
    However, the substantivalist view does not have a solution to the perspective problem. If the red rectangle, as illustrated in figure 18, is in that position1, and the green rectangle is in that position2, then the red rectangle will phenomenally look to both S1 and S2 to have that position1, and the green rectangle will phenomenally look to both S1 and S2 to have that position2. Substantivalism entails that the positions that the two rectangles phenomenally look to S1 to have are the same as the positions that the two rectangles phenomenally look to S2 to have, and intuitively this is not the case.
    
    Substantivalism may deny the intuition that the perspective problem exists. That is, the view may deny the intuition that the positions that the red and green rectangle phenomenally look to S1 to have are different from the positions that the red and green rectangle phenomenally look to S2 to have. However, this denial is inconsistent with the phenomenal character principle. Recall figures 15 and 16.
    
    Figure 15 t1
    
    Red rectangle
    
    Green rectangle
    
    S1
    
    Figure 16
    
    t2
    
    Green rectangle
    
    Red rectangle
    
    S1
    
    Figures 15 and 16 illustrate the red and green rectangles swapping position between t1 and t2. Suppose that, between t2 and t3, the red and green rectangles swap positions again, thereby
    
    returning to the positions that they had at t1, and S1 walks around the two rectangles, coming to view them from the opposite perspective. This is illustrated in figure 19.
    
    Figure 19
    
    S1 at t3
    
    Red rectangle
    
    Green rectangle
    
    It seems that there will be no visual phenomenal difference between the way that the rectangles phenomenally look to S1 at t2 and at t3. It follows from the phenomenal character principle that the rectangles phenomenally look to S1 to have the same positions at t2 and t3. We established already that the rectangles phenomenally look to have different positions at t1 and t2. It follows that the rectangles phenomenally look to have different positions at t1 and t3. This establishes that the perspective problem exists.
    
    One of the considerable advantages of observer-relative views is that they have a solution to the perspective problem: when S1 adopts the opposite perspective on the two rectangles between t2 and t3, a proponent of the observer-relative view can say that, at t2, the green rectangle
    
    phenomenally looks to the left of the red rectangle, and at t3, the green rectangle phenomenally looks to the right of the red rectangle.
    
    However, as we have seen in the last chapter and in this one, there are reasons to reject the observer-relative view. In the next chapter, I shall discuss the perspective problem further and offer an account of phenomenal position properties which provides a solution to the perspective problem.

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