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Mon 16 November at 11:48 PM

Papers I've Read

Two dogmas of empiricism

Two dogmas of empiricism

by:

WVO Quine

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Mad pain and Martian pain

Mad pain and Martian pain

by:

D Lewis

16 Mad Pain and Martian Pain David Lewis l There might be a strange man who
sometimes feels pain, just as we do, but whose pain differs greatly from ours in
its causes and effects. Our pain is typically caused by cuts, burns,  ...

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The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics

The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics

by:

D Zimmerman, M Loux, S Haslanger

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The Feasibility of Jumping to the Other Building

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The paradoxes of time travel

The paradoxes of time travel

by:

D Lewis

... VI. THE PARADOXES OF TIME TRAVEL DAVID LEWIS fT1 IME travel, I maintain, is possible.
The - paradoxes of time travel are oddities, not impossibilities. ...

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Defining'intrinsic'

Defining'intrinsic'

by:

D Lewis, R Langton

... times. Given that view, one way for you-now to be accompa- DEFINING INTRINSIC
333 Page 2. David ... 23. DEFINING INTRINSIC 337 Page 6. sense ...

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Is justified true belief knowledge?

Is justified true belief knowledge?

by:

EL Gettier

Page 1. ANALYSIS 23.6 JUNE 1963 IS JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF KNOWLEDGE? By EDMUND
L. GETTIER V ARIOUS attempts have been made in recent ...

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Knowing how

Knowing how

by:

T Williamson, J Stanley

M any philosophers believe that there is a fundamental dis- tinction between
knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to
Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability,  ...

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Time and Change

Time and Change

by:

EE Harris

Page 1. TIME AND CHANGE I ... vol. liiii. Page 5. TIME AND CHANGE 237 If we could renounce
all pictures and all metaphors, what then should we do ...

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Grue!: the new riddle of induction

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Dthat

Dthat

by:

D Kaplan

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Lewis on Finkish Dispositions

Lewis on Finkish Dispositions

by:

JL Kvanvig

... 3, September 1999 Lewis on Finkish Dispositions JONATHAN L. KVANVIG Texas A&M
University ... Finkish dispositions are dispositions which are lost precisely in ...

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Causes and Laws

Causes and Laws

by:

DM Armstrong, A Heathcote

Page 1. Causes and Laws ... CAUSES AND LAWS FALL APART Our object in this paper
is to show how causes and laws of nature are related. ...

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Mental events

Mental events

by:

D Davidson

Mental Events Donald Davidson Mental events such as perceivings, rememberings,
decisions, and actions re- sist capture in the nomological net of physical
theory. 1 How can this fact be reconciled with the causal role of mental  ...

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Time without change

Time without change

by:

S Shoemaker

... I2, JUNE 19, I969 TIME WITHOUT CHANGE ... The possibility of what I have described so
far is compatible with the claim that there can be no time without change. ...

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SPEAKER'S REFERENCE and SEMANTIC REFERENCE 1

SPEAKER'S REFERENCE and SEMANTIC REFERENCE 1

by:

S Kripke

Page 1. MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, I1 (1977) 0 1977 by Saul Kripke.
SPEAKER’S REFERENCE AND SEMANTIC REFERENCE’ SAUL KRIPKE 1 am going to
discuss some issues inspired by a well-known paper ...

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A puzzle about belief

A puzzle about belief

by:

S Kripke

SAUL A. KRIPKE A PUZZLE ABOUT BELIEF In this paper I will present a puzzle about
names and belief. A moral or two will be drawn about some other arguments that
have occasionally been ad- vanced in this area, but my main thesis is a  ...

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On denoting

On denoting

by:

B Russell

II.—ON DENOTING. By Bertrand Russell. By a " denoting phrase " I mean a phrase
such as any one of the following : a man, some man, any man, every man, all men,
the present King of England, the present King of France, the centre of mass  ...

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Against one Reason for Thinking that Visual Experiences have Representational Content

Against one Reason for Thinking that Visual Experiences have Representational Content

Forthcoming in Philosophical Perspectives, 2007 issue.

There is a widely held view in the philosophy of perception that visual experiences have representational content. One reason that I sometimes hear given in support of this view is that when something looks a certain way, it makes sense to ask whether or not it is the way it looks. I argue that this is not a good reason to think that visual experiences have representational content.

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New work for a theory of universals

New work for a theory of universals

by:

D Lewis

Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 61, No. 4, December 1983 NEW WORK FOR A
THEORY OF UNIVERSALS David Lewis Introduction. DM Armstrong offers a theory of
universals as the only adequate answer to a'compulsory question'for  ...

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Causation

Causation

by:

D Lewis

55 6 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY CAUSATION * HUME defined causation twice over. He
wrote "we may de- fine a cause to be an object followed by another, and where
all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to  ...

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Counterfactuals

Counterfactuals

by:

D Lewis

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Philosophical papers

Philosophical papers

by:

D Lewis

Published by Oxford University Press, Inc., 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New
York 10016-4314 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All
rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a  ...

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On the plurality of worlds

On the plurality of worlds

by:

D Lewis

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by  ...

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Convention: A philosophical study

Convention: A philosophical study

by:

DK Lewis

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by  ...

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The metaphysics of concepts

The metaphysics of concepts

by:

C Peacocke

Any plausible philosophy of mind has to make some use, however reluctantly, of
ways of thinking or modes of presentation. The modes of presentation may be
called senses, or guises, or ways of taking something. I will call them  ...

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How Are A Priori Truths Possible? 1

How Are A Priori Truths Possible? 1

by:

C Peacocke

It is also possible that your web browser is not configured or not able to
display style sheets. In this case, although the visual presentation will be
degraded, the site should continue to be functional. We recommend using the  ...

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Externalist explanation

Externalist explanation

by:

C Peacocke

I will be putting forward a thesis about how explanation by externalist states
works. My plan is to go on to indicate some of the consequences of this thesis
for a range of issues in the philo- sophy of mind. The range of issues  ...

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Perceptual content

Perceptual content

by:

C Peacocke

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Colour concepts and colour experience

Colour concepts and colour experience

by:

C Peacocke

What is the relation between the concept of an object's being red on the one
hand and experiences as of red objects on the other? That is the recalcitrant
question to which this paper is addressed. 1 The question contains the term  ...

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Nonconceptual content defended

Nonconceptual content defended

by:

C Peacocke

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LVIII, No. 2, June 1998  ... Of
the many theses in John McDowell's Mind and World (1994) that I would like to
discuss, I confine myself here to the battery of arguments he directs  ...

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Aesthetic value, objectivity, and the fabric of the world

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Functionalism and anomalous monism

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De re senses

De re senses

by:

J McDowell

The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 34 No. 136 ISSN 0031-8094 $2.00 DE RE SENSES By
John McDowell 1. It is commonly believed that a Fregean philosophy of language
and thought can represent an utterance, or a propositional attitude, as  ...

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The content of perceptual experience

The content of perceptual experience

by:

J McDowell

The Philosophical Qtiarterly Vol. 44, No. 175 April 1994 ISSN 0031-8094 THE
CONTENT OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE By John McDowell 1. Daniel Dennett's aim, in
his richly suggestive paper 'Toward a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness',1  ...

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Non-cognitivism and rule-following

Non-cognitivism and rule-following

by:

J McDowell

1 Non-cognitivists hold that ascriptions of value should not be conceived as
propositions of the sort whose correctness, or acceptability, consists in their
being true descriptions of the world; and, correlatively, that values are  ...

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On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name1

On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name1

by:

J McDowell

I . An interesting way to raise questions about the relation between language
and reality is to ask: how could we state a theory know- ledge of which would
suffice for understanding a language? Donald Davidson has urged that a  ...

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Are moral requirements hypothetical imperatives?

Are moral requirements hypothetical imperatives?

by:

IG McFetridge, J McDowell

2. The terminology calls for some preliminary comment. As  ... Mrs Foot notes,
Kant's concern was not with imperatives on a  ... "But why should I?", it was
sufficient to reply "You just should,  ... Suppose, for instance, that we  ...

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Values and secondary qualities

Values and secondary qualities

by:

J McDowell

2 Given that Mackie is right about the phenomenology of value, an attempt to ac
cept the appearances makes it virtually ir resistible to appeal to a perceptual
model. Now Mackie holds that the model must be perceptual awareness of  ...

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Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge

Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge

by:

L Wittgenstein, J McDowell

Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge JOHN McDOWELL IT is widely believed that
in his later work Wittgenstein introduced a special use of the notion of a
criterion. In this proprietary use,'criteria'are supposed to be a kind of  ...

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Virtue and reason

Virtue and reason

by:

J McDowell

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Truth and meaning

Truth and meaning

by:

J McDowell, G Evans, M Dummett

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Molyneux's question

Molyneux's question

by:

G Evans

14 Molyneux's Question Gareth Evans William Molyneux posed the following
question in a letter to Locke: Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and
taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same  ...

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Things without the mind

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Understanding demonstratives

Understanding demonstratives

by:

G Evans

DEMONSTRATIVES AND INDEXICALS 199 Understanding Demonstratives' GARETH EVANS It
has recently been claimed that the use of demonstrative or indexical expressions
like " today,"" yesterday,"" here,"" I,"" you"" this," etc., resists  ...

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Reference and contingency

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Can there be vague objects?

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The causal theory of names

The causal theory of names

by:

JEJ Altham, G Evans

Page 1. THE CAUSAL THEORY OF NAMES Gareth Evans and J. E. J. Altham I-Gareth
Evans I i. In a paper which provides the starting point of this en- quiry
Saul Kripke opposes what he calls the Description Theory ...

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Chopping up gunk

Chopping up gunk

by:

B Weatherson, J Hawthorne

Chopping up gunk. John HAWTHORNE, Brian WEATHERSON The Monist
87:33, 339-350, Hegeler Institute, 2004.

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Epistemic modals in context

Epistemic modals in context

by:

B Weatherson, J Hawthorne, A Egan

6 Epistemic Modals in Context ANDY EGAN, JOHN HAWTHORNE, AND BRIAN WEATHERSON In
the 19705 David Lewis argued for a contextualist treatment of modals (Lewis,
1976, 1979^). Although Lewis was primarily interested in modals connected  ...

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