Chapter 1
A Sparse View About The Properties That Objects Phenomenally Look To Have
1
Phenomenal Looking
In this chapter I identify a certain kind of looking, which I call phenomenal looking, and I explore what properties objects phenomenally look to have. I argue that objects phenomenally look to have only colours and positions, and that the colour properties do not include determinables such as being red.
I identify phenomenal looking by arguing for a constraint on it: a constraint that states a necessary condition on a kind of looking. My methodology is similar to that of someone who wishes to identify, say, a particular kind of justification, and does so by identifying a constraint on a particular kind of justification.
The following principle is a preliminary formulation of the constraint:
The Synchronic
Phenomenal Character Principle:
Necessarily, for all objects x, y and z, and all properties F and G, if x looks F to z, y does not look F to z, and y looks G to z, then there is a visual phenomenal difference between the ways that x and y look to z.
I intend to apply the constraint diachronically and across worlds. Therefore the full constraint, the phenomenal character principle, quantifies over times and worlds, and is as follows:
The Phenomenal Character Principle:
Necessarily, for all objects, x, y and z, all properties F and G, all times t1 and t2, and all worlds w1 and w2, if x looks F to z at t1 in w1, y does not look F to z at t2 in w2, and y looks G to z at t2 in w2, then there is a visual phenomenal difference between the way that x looks to z at t1 in w1 and the way that y looks to z at t2 in w2.
I assume that only one kind of looking satisfies the phenomenal character principle, and I call this phenomenal looking. What it means to say that there is a visual phenomenal difference between the ways that two objects, A and B, look to S is that what it is visually like for S for A to look the way it does to S is different from what it is visually like for S for B to look to the way it does to S.
The phenomenal character principle is phrased in terms of how things look to a particular subject. Sometimes I refer to the properties that objects phenomenally look to have and leave it implicit that there is some particular subject to whom these objects phenomenally look to have the properties in question.
The phenomenal character principle uses the locution ‘an object looks F’, where ‘F’ is to be replaced by an adjective. In English, some properties can be expressed by predicates of the form ‘is + adjective’. For instance, the property of being red can be expressed by the predicate ‘is red’. However, some properties, for instance, the property of being a tomato, are not expressed by predicates of the form ‘is + adjective’. There is no predicate ‘is tomatoey’ which expresses the property of being a tomato.
In order to express the question whether an object can stand in the phenomenal looking relation to the property of being a tomato, we could invent an adjective, ‘tomatoey’, stipulate that being tomatoey is identical with being a tomato, and then ask whether objects can phenomenally look tomatoey. Instead, however, I will simply ask whether an object can phenomenally look to be a tomato, or whether an object can phenomenally look to have the property of being a tomato. Phenomenally looking to be an F and phenomenal looking to have the property of being an F obey the same constraint as phenomenally looking F; that is, if an object x phenomenally looks to be F, and another object y does not phenomenally look to be F, but phenomenally looks to be G, then there is a visual phenomenal difference between the ways that x and y phenomenally
look to be. The stronger principle which quantifies over times and worlds also applies to phenomenally looking to be F.
Some philosophers have argued that the expression ‘looks to be’ refers to a more epistemic kind of looking than the expression ‘looks’. However I do not use ‘phenomenally looks to be’ in a different sense from ‘phenomenally looks’; they both obey the same constraint. Using the locution of ‘phenomenally looking to be an F’ is merely a way of avoiding having to introduce new adjectives such as ‘tomatoey’.
1.1
Externalist-looking
One way of understanding phenomenal looking is to consider kinds of looking that are not phenomenal. Suppose that everything that looks red to Joe looks green to Fay. And suppose that Joe and Fay are looking at a tomato, which looks red to Joe and green to Fay. Some externalists about perception, whom we shall call moderate externalists, have suggested that there are two kinds of looking, internalist-looking and externalist-looking. Internalist-looking is explained as the kind of looking involved in the tomato looking different colours to Joe and Fay. Moderate externalists allow that tomatoes internalist-look different to Joe and to Fay, even though cases of tomatoes internalist-looking the way they do to Joe are normally caused by the same surface reflectance properties as cases of tomatoes internalist-looking the way they do to Fay.
Externalist looking is introduced as follows:
Externalist-Looking:
Necessarily, for all objects x and y, and all properties F and G, if x internalist-looks F to y, and cases of objects internalist-looking F to y are normally caused by those objects being G, then x externalist-looks G to y.
The tomato internalist-looks different colours to Joe and to Fay. However, the tomato may well externalist-look to have the same properties to Joe and Fay. If cases of objects internalist-looking red to Joe are normally caused by those objects being G, and cases of internalist-looking green to Fay are normally caused by those objects being G, then the tomato will externalist-look G to Joe and to Fay.
Externalist-looking does not satisfy the phenomenal character principle. Suppose that Joe is looking at a tomato, which internalist-looks red to him. Say that the tomato externalist-looks G to him. Suppose that in world w1, cases of internalist-looking red to Joe are normally caused by objects being F, where being F is distinct from being G. In that world, when the tomato internalist-looks red to Joe, it will externalist-look F to him, i.e. different from how it actually externalist-looks to him, even though there is no visual phenomenal difference between the way the tomato looks to Joe in the actual world and the way it looks in w1. It follows that externalistlooking does not satisfy the phenomenal character principle.
Internalist-looking, by contrast, does seem to satisfy the phenomenal character principle. It seems to follow from the tomato internalist-looking different to Joe and Fay that there is a visual phenomenal difference between the way the tomato looks to Joe and the way it looks to Fay.
Some externalists will reject the claim that there is internalist-looking. Let us call such an externalist a radical externalist. Since externalist-looking was introduced in terms of internalistlooking, a radical externalist will deny that there is externalist-looking. A radical externalist will acknowledge that there is externalist-looking*, a constraint on which is as follows:
Externalist-looking*:
Necessarily, for all objects x and y, and all properties F, x externalist-looks* F to y only if there is a mental state s of y such that s is normally caused by the presence of F-ness.
Thus, an object externalist-looks* red to Joe only if there is a mental state of Joe which is normally caused by redness. A radical externalist will account for the intuition that everything that looks red to Joe might look green to Fay as follows. They will hold that, for some surface reflectance property F, what it is visually like for Joe for objects to externalist-look* F to him is different from what it is visually like for Fay for objects to externalist-look* F to her.
The disagreement between the radical externalist and the moderate externalist concerns whether there is a kind of looking that is individuated in terms of visual phenomenal character.
The moderate externalist holds that there is such a kind of looking, and the radical externalist denies this.
In this chapter I claim that there is a kind of looking, phenomenal looking, that is individuated in terms of visual phenomenal character, and, in particular, one that obeys the phenomenal character principle. By contrasting phenomenal looking with other kinds of looking, I hope to make the claim that there is phenomenal looking plausible.
There is a third kind of externalist position which would reject an assumption common to moderate and radical externalism. We will call this kind of externalist a phenomenal externalist. A phenomenal externalist endorses the following claim:
Phenomenal Externalism: Necessarily, for all subjects x and y, if the mental states of x are normally caused by the same properties as the mental states of y, then what it is like for x to have x’s mental states is the same as what it is like for y to have y’s mental states.
According to a phenomenal externalist, if the mental states of Joe and Fay are normally caused by the same properties of objects, then what it is like for Joe to see tomatoes is the same as what it is like for Fay to see tomatoes. Both the moderate and the radical externalist reject this claim. In this chapter I do not argue against phenomenal externalism, but merely note that it seems counter-intuitive. It seems plausible that even if the mental states of Joe and Fay are
normally caused by the same properties of objects, what it is like for Joe and Fay to see certain objects may differ. In what follows I will assume that phenomenal externalism is false.
1.2
Epistemic Looking
It is intuitive that some looks-statements refer to a state of a subject that is at least partly epistemic. For instance, if Joan is looking at a DVD cover, she may say ‘this film looks intriguing’, and, intuitively, this looks-statement refers to an epistemic kind of looking.
It seems that epistemic looking is not phenomenal looking. There can be cases in which the way an object epistemically looks changes between t1 and t2 without there being any visual phenomenal difference between the way the object looks at t1 and the way it looks at t2. Suppose that, at t1, one is told that one is in a room where all and only red things look green. When one is asked to pick out the red objects, one may well find an object that looks green, and say ‘that object looks red to me’. At t2 one is told that the room is such that all and only blue things look green. When asked to pick out blue things, one may well find an object which looks green and say ‘that object looks blue to me’.
Assuming that one’s looks-statements in this context refer to epistemic looking, the way that the objects epistemically look between t1 and t2 has changed, and yet there need be no visual phenomenal difference between the ways that the objects look at t1 and the ways that they look at
t2; in the phenomenal sense of ‘looks’, the objects look green at t1 and at t2. Thus epistemic looking does not satisfy the phenomenal character principle.
1.3
Nonconceptual Looking
Nonconceptual looking is constrained by the following principle:
The Nonconceptual Principle:
Necessarily, for all objects x and y and all properties F, x nonconceptually looks F to y only if x’s looking F to y does not entail that y has a concept of F.
A kind of looking is conceptual iff it is not nonconceptual. One might wonder whether there are any connections between the notion of phenomenal looking and the notions of conceptual and nonconceptual looking. One might wonder, for instance, whether phenomenal looking would have to be nonconceptual.
Prima facie there are no connections between phenomenal looking and nonconceptual looking. The central notion in the constraint on phenomenal looking was the notion of a visual phenomenal difference, and it does not seem that there is any property of visual phenomenal differences which suggests that phenomenal looking should be either nonconceptual or conceptual.
1.4
Theory-laden Looking
There is a position according to which all seeing is theory-laden. According to this position, what theories one has can influence the way things look to one. Nelson Goodman defends this position in the following passage:
‘The myths of the innocent eye and the absolute given are unholy accomplices. Both derive from and foster the idea of knowing as a processing of raw material received from the senses, and of this raw material as being discoverable either through purification rites or by methodical disinterpretation. But reception and interpretation are not separable operations; they are thoroughly interdependent… Content cannot be extracted by peeling off layers of comment.’ (Nelson Goodman, 1976, p8.)
And David Lewis seems to take the same view in the following passage:
‘Hintikka uses causal relations for cross-identification between the actual world and its perceptual alternatives, but not for cross-identification between these alternatives… I think my use of causal relations even in cross-identifying between alternatives has its uses in the perceptual case… and is indispensable in the doxastic and epistemic cases. It has its price: suitably ordinary causal relations must prevail in the perceptual alternatives, making causal information part of the content of perceptual experience. But I think that objectionable only given the forlorn hope that we can speak sensibly of the pure content of perceptual experience, separated from all collateral information.’ (David Lewis, 1999, p380, n.7).
The view being defended in the above two passages seems to be that all looking is theory-laden looking; that is, that all looking is such that what theories one has can affect what properties objects can look to one to have. One might wonder whether there are any connections
between theory-laden looking and phenomenal looking. For instance, one might wonder whether phenomenal looking would have to be looking that is not theory-laden.
Prima facie there is no connection between phenomenal looking and theory-laden looking. The visual phenomenal differences referred to by the phenomenal character principle may be generated and influenced by the theories that one has, or they may not be. Susanna Siegel defends a view on which the theories that one has can introduce visual phenomenal differences into the ways that objects look; we shall consider her argument below. There does not seem to be any obvious requirement that phenomenal looking is either theory-laden or non-theory-laden.
1.5
The Relata of Phenomenal Looking
The property view is as follows:
The Property View:
Phenomenal looking is a relation between two objects and a property.
The two objects in question are the perceived object and the perceiving subject. Thus, according to the property view, A’s phenomenally looking F to S is a matter of A’s standing in the phenomenal looking relation to S and to the property of being F.
The propositional view is as follows:
The Propositional View:
Phenomenal looking is a relation between a subject and a proposition.
The relation in question is that of visual representation, and the proposition in question may be singular or general. Let us call the view on which the proposition in question is a singular proposition the singular propositional view, and let us call the view on which the proposition in question is a general proposition the general proposition view. According to the singular propositional view, A’s phenomenally looking F to S is a matter of S’s standing in the visual representation relation to the proposition that A is F, and according to the general propositional view, A’s phenomenally looking F to S is a matter of S’s standing in the visual representation relation to the proposition that something is F.
It seems that there are some grounds for favouring the property view over the propositional view. Consider (1) and (2):
(1) A is the colour that it phenomenally looks to S. (2) A is the colour that B phenomenally looks to S.
A defender of the singular propositional view is likely to endorse (3) as a specification of the truth-conditions of (1):
(3) (1) is true iff the proposition about the colour of A that S stands in the visual representation relation to is true.
It seems that the truth-conditions of (2) should be similar in structure to the truthconditions of (1). However a defender of the singular propositional view who endorses (3) cannot accommodate this fact. Suppose that A phenomenally looks red, and B phenomenally looks green. A defender of the singular propositional view will hold that S stands in the visual representation relation to the propositions that A is red and that B is green. However, the truth of neither of these propositions is relevant to the truth of (2). On the supposition in question about the colours that A and B phenomenally look, whether (2) is true is determined by whether or not A is green.
The argument against the singular propositional view is that it seems that a defender of the view would endorse (3) as a specification of the truth-conditions of (1). Intuitively, the truthconditions of (2) have a similar structure to the truth-conditions of (1). However, a defender of the singular propositional view cannot hold that anything like (3) specifies the truth-conditions of (1).
A defender of the general propositional view does not seem to be better off than a defender of the singular propositional view in this respect. Consider all the ways that A phenomenally looks, and call the proposition that something has those ways P1. Consider all the ways that B phenomenally looks, and call the proposition that something has those ways P2. A defender of the general propositional view will hold that S visually represents P1 and P2.
Although the truth of P1 is relevant to the truth of (1), neither P1 nor P2 is relevant to the truth of (2).
One might accept the property view, but hold the propositional property view:
Propositional Property View:
Phenomenal looking is a relation between two objects and a propositional property.
A propositional property is, for some proposition p, the property of being such that p is true. A non-propositional property is a property that is not a propositional property. Thus, the property of being such that 2 + 2 = 4 is a propositional property, and the property of being red is a non-propositional property.
We should reject the propositional property view for the same reason that we rejected the propositional view. Suppose that A phenomenally looks red to S, and suppose that a defender of the propositional property view holds that A phenomenally looks red to S iff A stands in the phenomenal looking relation to S and to the property of being such that A is red. Then it seems that (1) will be true iff A is such that A is red. Suppose that B phenomenally looks green. Assuming that the truth-conditions of (1) and (2) have a similar structure, then (2) will be true, on the propositional property view, iff A is such that B is green. However, given the suppositions that we have made concerning the colour that A and B phenomenally look to have, intuitively (2) is true iff A is green.
In the argument just given we assumed that the propositions in question are singular propositions. However, as in the case of the propositional view, the propositional property view is no better off if the propositions are general.
Thus, it seems that we should accept the non-propositional property view:
The Non-Propositional Property View:
Phenomenal looking is a relation between two objects and a non-propositional property.
There may be some reasons for thinking that S has perceptual states with propositional contents. For instance, some think that, when S is hallucinating, and therefore when nothing phenomenally looks any way to S, S is nevertheless in a perceptual state with a certain propositional content. None of the above points challenges this particular thought. The aim of the above points has been to show that there is no obvious entailment from A’s phenomenally looking red to S to S’s being in a perceptual state with a propositional content.
The non-propositional property view, and the property view in general, might be challenged in a different way. Consider the looking/talking principle:
The Ways of Looking/Talking Principle: Ways of looking are analogous to ways of talking, dancing, and eating, and ways of performing actions generally.
We report ways of performing actions using adverbs. For instance, we might say (1) or (2):
(1) Jenny talks quickly (2) Chris dances well.
If the ways of looking/talking principle is correct, then, instead of saying (3), we should say (4):
(3) This apple looks red (4) This apple looks redly.
The ways of looking/talking principle challenges the property view in the following way. We do not think that Jenny’s talking quickly involves Jenny standing in the talking relation to the property of being quick, nor that Chris’s dancing well involves Chris standing in the dancing relation to the property of being good. If the ways of looking/talking principle is correct, then, by analogy, we should not think of object O’s looking red to subject S as involving O standing in the looking relation to S and to the property of being red. By extension, we should not think of O’s phenomenally looking red to S as involving O standing in the phenomenal looking relation to S and to the property of being red.
The motivation for the ways of looking/talking principle is that we are inclined to say both (5) and (6):
(5) Jenny talks a certain way. (6) Jenny looks a certain way.
Similarly, we may refer to the way that Jenny talks, and the way that Jenny looks. However, the linguistic similarity between (5) and (6) seems misleading. (5) seems to be short for (7), whilst (6) does not seem to be short for (8):
(7) Jenny talks in a certain way. (8) Jenny looks in a certain way.
Similarly, rather than referring to the way that Jenny talks, it seems more correct to refer to the way in which Jenny talks. Consider sentence (9).
(9) Jenny was described a certain way.
(9) seems to have two readings. On the property reading, (9) means that there is a property that Jenny was described as having. For instance, she might have been described as beautiful. On the adverbial reading, (9) means that the describing was performed in a certain way. For instance, the describing might have been done concisely. (6) seems to be more analogous to the property reading of (9) than it is to the adverbial reading of (9).
The first argument that the ways of looking/talking principle is false is that (5) seems short for (7), but (6) does not seem short for (8). The second argument that the ways of looking/talking principle is false is that (10) seems assertable but (11) does not seem assertable:
(10) (11)
Jenny is the way she looks. Jenny is the way she talks.
If Jenny talks quickly, then (11) is true iff (12) is true, but (12) is not grammatical:
(12)
Jenny is quickly.
Thus, it does not seem that (11) is assertable. By contrast (10) does seem to be assertable. The fact that (10) is assertable suggests that we should say (3) rather than (4) above. Thus, it seems that we should reject the ways of looking/talking principle, and retain the nonpropositional property view.
2
The Phenomenal Difference Test
In this section I discuss a test, the phenomenal difference test, that is designed to help determine which properties objects phenomenally look to have. I will first apply it to the property of being a tomato. In the presentation of the argument, it will be a simplifying assumption that objects phenomenally look to have shape properties. I will later argue that objects do not phenomenally look to have shape properties, but in the argument that follows the
assumption is harmless. I also assume, in the arguments that follow, that objects phenomenally look to have shades of colour, and position properties.
2.1
Being a tomato
Consider all the specific colour and shape properties that a particular tomato phenomenally looks to a subject to have. Call this highly specific set of colour and shape properties the tomato colour and shape properties. The first part of my argument is that it is possible for an object phenomenally to look to have the tomato colour and shape properties without the object phenomenally looking to be a tomato. That is, the following principle is true:
The Tomato Anti-Entailment Principle:
For all objects x and y, x’s phenomenally looking to y to have the tomato colour and shape properties does not entail that x phenomenally looks to y to be a tomato.
Suppose that in another possible world, w1, there are twin-tomatoes. Twin-tomatoes are not tomatoes, but there is no visual phenomenal difference between the way that tomatoes and twin-tomatoes look. Suppose that a given tomato phenomenally looks to Oscar, an inhabitant of the actual world, to have the tomato colour and shape properties, and a given twin-tomato phenomenally looks to twin-Oscar, an inhabitant of w1, to have the tomato colour and shape properties as well.
It would be very implausible to say that this twin-tomato phenomenally looks to twinOscar to be a tomato, and therefore that the twin-tomato is not the way it phenomenally looks to him. Twin-Oscar has as much right to say that the tomato in the actual world phenomenally looks to Oscar to be a twin-tomato, and therefore is not the way it phenomenally looks to Oscar. The correct description of w1 seems to be that the twin-tomato phenomenally looks to have the tomato colour and shape properties without phenomenally looking to be at tomato. This example establishes the tomato anti-entailment principle.
We are now in a position to apply the phenomenal difference test. The test can be applied in two ways, a diachronic and a synchronic way. I will start with the diachronic way.
Suppose that, at t1, O phenomenally looks to have the tomato colour and shape properties, but does not phenomenally look to be a tomato. Suppose that at t2, O comes phenomenally to look to be a tomato in addition to phenomenally looking to have the tomato colour and shape properties. What kind of visual phenomenal difference might we expect to notice between the way O looks at t1 and t2?
The kind of possibility envisaged in the paragraph above is stronger than that entailed by the tomato anti-entailment principle, but it does not seem that there are grounds for ruling it out, once the tomato anti-entailment principle has been granted.
Suppose that we applied the phenomenal difference test to two shades of colour. At t3, O phenomenally looks red56, and then at t4, O phenomenally looks green32. It seems clear what the visual phenomenal difference is between the way that O looks at t3 and the way O looks at t4. This is the kind of visual phenomenal difference we are expecting to notice between the way O looks at t1 and the way O looks at t2. It seems that we cannot imagine a visual phenomenal difference between the way O looks at t1 and the way O looks at t2, and this suggests that objects do not phenomenally look to be tomatoes.
A different application of the diachronic phenomenal difference test is as follows. Suppose that at t1, O phenomenally looks to have the tomato colour and shape properties, as well as the property of being a tomato. And suppose that at t2, O still phenomenally looks to have the tomato colour and shape properties, but phenomenally looks to be a banana instead of a tomato. What kind of visual phenomenal difference might we expect to notice between the ways that O looks at t1 and t2? It seems that we cannot imagine a difference, and this suggests that objects do not phenomenally look to be tomatoes, or bananas.
Susanna Siegel has proposed an argument that suggests that she would hold that there is a visual phenomenal difference between the way that tomatoes look before and after one acquires a recognitional capacity for tomatoes. John Searle has argued that there is a visual phenomenal difference between the way a house looks depending on whether one thinks of the house as a mere façade, or as a whole house. I consider these arguments in section 3.
Another possible response to the above argument is as follows. Suppose that phenomenal externalism is true, and therefore that the phenomenal character of one’s mental states is determined by what properties those mental states are normally caused by. It might be that, at t1, the state of affairs of an object’s phenomenally looking to have the tomato colour and shape properties is normally caused by that object’s being a tomato, whilst at t2, the state of affairs of an object’s phenomenally looking to have the tomato colour and shape properties is normally caused by that object’s being a banana. The phenomenal externalist might argue that this difference in the causal facts suffices for a visual phenomenal difference between the way O looks at t1 and at t2. This is a possible response to the argument. In this chapter I am assuming that phenomenal externalism is false, but I acknowledge that some may find it an attractive way out of the above argument.
Now I will apply the phenomenal difference test in a synchronic way. Suppose that we have two objects in front of us, A and B. Suppose that both A and B phenomenally look to have the tomato colour and shape properties, and that in addition, A phenomenally looks to be a tomato, while B does not.
Admittedly, this kind of possibility is also stronger than that entailed by the tomato antientailment principle, but, again, it does not seem that there are grounds for ruling it out, once the tomato anti-entailment principle has been granted.
What kind of visual phenomenal difference might there be between the ways that A and B look? Again, suppose that we had applied the synchronic phenomenal difference test to two
shades of colour. If we had said that C and D phenomenally look the same shape but C phenomenally looks green32 and D phenomenally looks red21, it would be clear what the visual phenomenal difference would be between the ways that C and D look to us. Returning to the application of the synchronic phenomenal difference test to the property of being a tomato, it seems that we cannot imagine what visual phenomenal difference there might be between the ways that A and B look to us, and this suggests that objects do not phenomenally look to be tomatoes.
A different application of the synchronic phenomenal difference test is as follows. Suppose that A and B phenomenally look to have the same colour and shape properties, and A phenomenally looks to be a tomato, whilst B phenomenally looks to be a banana. What kind of visual phenomenal difference might there be between the ways that A and B look? It seems that we cannot imagine such a difference, and this suggests that objects do not phenomenally look to be tomatoes or bananas.
I now apply the phenomenal difference test to the following properties, and I argue that objects do not phenomenally look to have them.
• • • • •
being a table being expensive for any properties F and G, having changed from F to G for some event E, causing E being red
• •
for any object x, being the same colour as x being square
2.2
Being a table, being expensive
Let us apply the phenomenal difference test to the property of being a table. Suppose that we have two objects, A and B, which phenomenally look to have all the same colour and shape properties, and A phenomenally looks to be a table and B does not phenomenally look to be a table. What kind of visual phenomenal difference might there be between the ways that A and B look? It seems that we cannot imagine such a visual phenomenal difference, and this suggests that objects do not phenomenally look to be tables.
Suppose that A and B phenomenally look to have the same colour and shape properties, but A phenomenally looks expensive and B does not. What kind of phenomenal difference might there be between the ways that A and B look? It seems that we cannot imagine such a visual phenomenal difference, and this suggests that objects do not phenomenally look expensive.
2.3
Depth properties
Let us now consider depth properties. It seems that at least objects phenomenally look to have positions on an x, or left-right, axis, and on a y, or up-down, axis. Do objects phenomenally
look to have positions on a z, or forwards-backwards, axis? I shall call positions on each of these axes ‘coordinates’, and I shall argue that it is prima facie implausible that objects phenomenally look to have z coordinates.
For simplicity, I will assume in this argument that objects phenomenally look to have certain sizes. Later in this chapter I will argue that objects do not phenomenally look to have size properties, but the assumption in the following argument to the contrary is harmless.
Consider the following anti-entailment principle:
The Depth Anti-Entailment Principle:
Necessarily, for all objects x and y, there is no size property F and no z coordinate G such that x’s phenomenally looking F to y entails that x phenomenally looks G to y.
Suppose one is looking at a red square kite in a blue sky, and one does not know what the object of one’s perception is. The kite phenomenally looks a certain size. If the kite increases in size between t1 and t2, the kite will phenomenally look a greater size at t2 than at t1. Although the kite phenomenally looks a certain size at t1, it does not seem that there is any particular z coordinate which the kite phenomenally looks. And this seems true regardless of what size property the kite phenomenally looks to have. Thus the size anti-entailment principle seems intuitive. We are now in a position to apply the phenomenal difference test.
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that objects do phenomenally look to have z coordinates. Suppose that an object, O, phenomenally looks the same size, shape, and colour properties, and the same x and y coordinates from t1 to t2. At t1, O phenomenally looks to have z coordinate z15, and then at t2 O phenomenally looks to have z coordinate z20, so O phenomenally looks further away at t2 than at t1. We are imagining an isolated change between t1 and t2 in the z coordinate that O phenomenally looks to have. None of the other properties that O phenomenally looks to have at t1 changes. What kind of visual phenomenal difference might we expect to notice between the way that O looks at t1 and t2?
Suppose that instead of focussing on a change in the z coordinate that O phenomenally looked to have between t1 and t2, we considered a change in the x coordinate that O phenomenally looked to have between t1 and t2. That is, O phenomenally looks the same colour, size, shape, y and z coordinate between t1 and t2, but it phenomenally looks to have a different x coordinate at t1 from the one it phenomenally looks to have at t2. The position O phenomenally looks to have at t2 is either further to the right or further to the left of the position that O phenomenally looks to have at t1. It seems that there would be a clear visual phenomenal difference between the way that O looks at t1 and the way that O looks at t2.
Returning to the case of the change in the z coordinate that O phenomenally looks to have, it seems we cannot imagine what kind of visual phenomenal difference there might be between the way that O looks at t1 and the way that O looks at t2. This is prima facie evidence that objects do not phenomenally look to have z coordinates.
In chapter 5 I argue that the possibility of 360 degree vision suggests that the phenomenal difference test in this case can be met, and that objects do phenomenally look to have z coordinates. The aim of this section is merely to show that there is a prima facie challenge to the idea that objects phenomenally look to have z coordinates.
2.4
Change
Let us now consider the property of having changed some property or other, for instance, the property of having changed position, or changed colour. Let us address the question whether a given object, O, ever phenomenally looks to have changed colour between t1 and t2. Certainly it is possible that there are two different colours, F and G, and O phenomenally looks F at t1, and phenomenally looks G at t2. However, what is at issue is whether it is ever the case that O phenomenally looks to have changed from red to green, where ‘changed from red to green’ is within the scope of the ‘phenomenally looks’.
Historically this problem has been usually put by asking whether there is perception of change, as opposed to mere change of perception. Change of perception is simply a matter of having different perceptions at different times. Perception of change, as we shall interpret it, is a matter of objects phenomenally looking to have changed, where, for two properties F and G, ‘was F and is now G’ is within the scope of ‘phenomenally looking’.
Suppose that at t1, object A phenomenally looks red, and at t2, A phenomenally looks green. To say, at t2, that A phenomenally looks to have changed from being red to being green is to say that A phenomenally looks to have been red earlier and green now. Let us apply the phenomenal difference test to this case.
Suppose that there are two objects, A and B. At t1, A and B phenomenally look red. At t2, A and B phenomenally look green. Whilst, at t2, B phenomenally looks to have been red earlier and green now, A, at t2, does not phenomenally look to have been red earlier and green now; A, at t2, simply phenomenally looks green. What kind of visual phenomenal difference might we expect to notice between the ways that A and B look between t1 and t2? It seems hard to imagine what visual phenomenal difference there might be, and this suggests that objects do not phenomenally look to have been red earlier and green now.
One could respond by arguing that the state of affairs in which at t1 A phenomenally looks red, and at t2, A phenomenally looks green, entails that A phenomenally looks to have been red earlier and green now. If this was the case, then we could not apply the phenomenal difference test. The anti-entailment principle that is relevant to this argument is as follows:
The Change Anti-Entailment Principle:
For all objects x and y, properties F and G and times t1 and t2, the facts that, at t1, x phenomenally looks F to y, and, at t2, x phenomenally looks G to y, do not entail that, at t2, x phenomenally looks to y to have been F previously and G at t2.
The change anti-entailment principle seems very intuitive. For instance if a particular object, O, phenomenally looks red to S on Monday, and phenomenally looks green to S on Tuesday, it seems implausible to say that it follows that, on Tuesday, O phenomenally looks to S to have been red previously and green on Tuesday.
One might argue that, if one is continuously looking at O, and the colour that O phenomenally looks changes from red to green, then it follows that O phenomenally looks to have been red earlier and green now. However, this claim does not seem plausible either. It seems intuitive that there are cases in which one continuously looks at some object O between two times t1 and t2, and, at t1, O phenomenally looks red, and, at t2, O phenomenally looks green, and one is not inclined to say that, at t2, O phenomenally looks to have been red previously and green now. If there is an entailment principle that concerns phenomenally looking to have been red earlier and green now, it is not clear what it is.
The argument above concerning change generalizes to rule out objects phenomenally looking to move. An object phenomenally looking to move is a matter of the object phenomenally looking to be changing its position properties, which, in turn, seems to be a matter of the object phenomenally looking to have been there before and here now.
We can apply the phenomenal difference test to this case as well. Suppose that we are looking at two balls, A and B, travelling the same distance at the same speed. Each ball phenomenally looks the same shape and colour and size, and the positions that each ball
phenomenally looks to have are changing at the same rate. Moreover, whilst A phenomenally looks to be moving, B does not phenomenally look to be moving. B is such that the position it phenomenally looks to have is different at each time, but it does not phenomenally look to be moving. What kind of visual phenomenal difference might we expect to notice between the way that A looks and the way that B looks? It seems that there will be no visual phenomenal difference, and this suggests that objects do not phenomenally look to move.
2.5
Causal properties
Let us consider whether events phenomenally look to cause other events. Suppose that there are two objects, A and B, and that the following facts obtain:
t1: t2: t3:
Both A and B phenomenally look red. A phenomenally looks green; B phenomenally looks red. A phenomenally looks green; B phenomenally looks green.
Therefore, the colour that A phenomenally looks changes from red to green between t1 and t2, and the colour that B phenomenally looks follows suit from t2 to t3. Let us now ask whether, at t3, A phenomenally looks to have caused it to be the case that B is green.
The answer to this question seems to be ‘no’. If one swapped B for a qualitative duplicate, say C, the result would be that A looks to bear a relation to C rather than B, which is a
different way that A would look, and yet there would be no visual phenomenal difference in the way that A looks.
However, we can remove B from within the scope of the ‘phenomenally looks’ and rephrase the original question by asking whether, at t3, A phenomenally looks to have caused it to be the case that there is some green object. We can apply the phenomenal difference test to this case. Suppose that, in addition to A and B above, there is another pair of objects, C and D. The facts about the colours that C and D phenomenally look over time are the same as with A and B, namely:
t1: t2: t3:
Both C and D phenomenally look red. C phenomenally looks green; D phenomenally looks red. C phenomenally looks green; D phenomenally looks green.
The difference between A and B on the one hand, and C and D on the other hand, is the following:
t3:
A phenomenally looks to have caused it to be the case that there is some green object; C does not phenomenally look to have caused it to be the case that there is some green object.
What might the visual phenomenal difference be between the way A looks and the way that C looks? It seems that we cannot imagine what this visual phenomenal difference would be, and this suggests that objects do not phenomenally look to cause it to be the case that there is something that is green.
There is also the question whether objects phenomenally look to cause it to be the case that an object is at such and such location. The argument given above could be adapted to imply that this property is not one that objects phenomenally look to have.
2.6
The property of having a back
Let us now consider whether objects phenomenally look to have backs. Suppose we are looking at a particular tomato. One question is whether the tomato phenomenally looks to have a back. A second question is whether there is a certain kind of back, say a semi-spherical one, which the tomato phenomenally looks to have.
Before we apply the phenomenal difference test to this case, we should consider whether the two anti-entailment principles in question hold. For instance, one might hold that it follows from a particular object phenomenally looking red and round that it phenomenally looks to have a back of a particular kind. This seems implausible. Suppose that there is a world, w1, in which tomatoes are semi-spherical, and that in w1 a subject, S, is looking at the curved side of a tomato. Intuitively, the tomato’s not having a semi-spherical back would not provide a reason for
thinking that the tomato is not the way it phenomenally looks, and this suggests that in w1, the tomato does not phenomenally look to have a semi-spherical back. This establishes that phenomenally looking red and round does not entail phenomenally looking to have a semispherical back.
One might hold that phenomenally looking round entails phenomenally looking to have some back, and one might defend this view by arguing that the properties that objects phenomenally look to have are closed under obvious entailment. Later I argue that phenomenally looking red21 does not entail phenomenally looking red, even though the entailment between being red21 and being red is obvious. If this argument is sound, a special argument would have to be given for thinking that phenomenally looking round entails phenomenally looking to have a back.
In what follows I shall assume the anti-entailment principle that phenomenally looking to be red and round does not entail phenomenally looking to have a back. Suppose that objects A and B phenomenally look the same colour and shape properties, and A phenomenally looks to have a back whilst B does not. What kind of visual phenomenal difference might we expect to notice between the ways that A and B look? It seems that we cannot imagine such a difference, and this suggests that objects do not phenomenally look to have backs.
3
The Arguments of Searle and Siegel
Susanna Siegel and John Searle argue that there are visual phenomenal differences that are not accounted for in terms of different colour and position properties that objects phenomenally look to have. Searle gives two examples:
‘Consider the following figure:
‘This can be seen as the word ‘TOOT’, as a table with two large balloons underneath, as the numeral 1001 with a line over the top, as a bridge with two pipelines crossing underneath, as the eyes of a man wearing a hat with string hanging down each side, and so on….. ‘Consider, for example, the difference between looking at the front of a house where one takes it to be the front of a whole house, and looking at the front of a house where one takes it to be a mere façade, e.g. as part of a movie set. If one believes one is seeing a whole house, the front of the house actually looks different from the way it looks if one believes one is seeing a false façade of a house….It is part of the content of my visual experience when I look at a whole house that I expect the rest of the house to be there if, for example, I enter the house or go round to the back.’ (Searle, 1983, p54-55).
Siegel also gives two examples:
‘Consider a page of Cyrillic text. The way it looks to someone before and after she learns to read Russian seems to bring about a phenomenological difference in how the text looks. (Christopher Peacocke makes a similar phenomenological claim in ch. 3 of A Study of Concepts). When you are first learning to read the script of a language that is new to you, you have to attend to each word, and perhaps to each letter, separately. In contrast, once you can easily read it, it takes a special effort to attend to the shapes of the script separately from its semantic properties. You become disposed to attend to the semantic properties of the words in the text, and less disposed to attend visually to the orthographic ones.
The second example involves a different recognitional disposition. Suppose you have never seen a pine tree before, and are hired to cut down all the pine trees in a grove containing trees of many different sorts. Someone points out to you which trees are pine trees. Some weeks pass, and your disposition to distinguish the pine trees from the others improves. Eventually, you can spot the pine trees immediately: they become visually salient to you. Like the recognitional disposition you gain, the salience of the trees emerges gradually. Gaining this recognitional disposition is reflected in a phenomenological difference between the visual experiences had before and after the recognitional disposition was fully developed.’ (Siegel, 2006, p490-491)
We can put the challenge posed by the above passages as follows: there exist visual phenomenal differences that are best explained in terms of objects phenomenally looking to have properties other than colours and positions.
In sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 I will offer alternative explanations of the phenomena described by Searle and Siegel. In section 3.4 I will argue that even if the phenomena that Searle and Siegel describe do require that objects phenomenally look to have properties other than colours or positions, these properties do not include natural kind properties, such as the property of being a tomato.
I will consider three different kinds of case: firstly, Searle’s ‘TOOT’ aspect-switching case, secondly, Searle’s house/façade case and thirdly, Siegel’s language and pine tree cases.
3.1
Aspect-switching
Searle’s ‘TOO figure b OT’ below is one of a variety of ambiguous figures: f figures which one h can see u under differe aspects, o which one can see as d ent or e different typ of object. pes
Other exampl of ambig O les guous figures include the duck/rabbit picture: s e t
from http://m mathworld.w wolfram.com m/Rabbit-Duc ckIllusion.ht tml) (f And A also the young girl/o woman p old picture:
(from http://mathworld.wolfram.com/YoungGirl-OldWomanIllusion.html) I will argue that the phenomenal shifts in these examples are explicable in terms of the following differences:
• • •
differences in patterns of attention differences in how one takes the objects to be differences in how one visually imagines the objects to be
Searle and Siegel argue that the best explanation of the visual phenomenal differences is that, in their terminology, visual experiences represent properties in addition to colours and positions. Let us call this account of aspect-switching the content view. Let us call the account I shall defend, which appeals to the above three factors, the non-content view. The non-content view is so-called because it does not appeal to differences in the properties that the objects in question phenomenally look to have.
I will use the expressions ‘seeing as’ and ‘seeing under a certain aspect’ in such a way that it is not controversial that one can see ambiguous figures as different kinds of objects, or under various aspects. I take the substantive issue to concern the question what the best explanation of seeing as is.
3.1.1
Patterns of attention
Normally, aspect-switching on an ambiguous figure is accompanied by a shift in one’s patterns of attention towards the figure, though these shifts need not be the same for different individuals. My patterns of attention change in the following way when I see the above ambiguous figures under different aspects. When seeing the duck/rabbit as a rabbit, I tend to look at the picture from left to right, and when seeing it as a duck, I tend to look at it from right to left. Also, when seeing it as a rabbit, I attend to the rabbit’s mouth and eye together, when I see it as a duck, I attend to the duck’s eye and beak together. When seeing ‘TOOT’ as the word ‘TOOT’, I tend to attend to the whole word at once, whereas when I see it as a man wearing a hat with strings hanging down each side, I tend to attend to the eyes first and then the hat. When I see the young girl/old woman as an old woman, I tend to attend to the mouth and the eyes first, and when I see it as a young girl, I attend to her cheek and left shoulder first.
Changing one’s patterns of attention towards a figure can cause a phenomenal difference to occur. Consider the following picture:
In nitially, one’ attention i evenly distributed ove the shapes in the pictur After one ’s is er re. e sees the D Dalmatian in the middle of the pictu one atten to the specific outlin of the n ure, nds ne Dalmatia There see to be a p an. ems phenomenal difference a associated w this shift in one’s pat with t ttern of attenti ion.
Consider figu A below. One can see figure A as being com C ure . mposed of a w white triangle e superimp posed on black circles, an one can s figure A as composed of three bl nd see lack circles w with wedges c out of the When on sees figur A as comp cut em. ne re posed of a w white triangle superimposed e on black circles, it se eems that one attends to the straight l lines betwee the three b en black circles that s e o triangle. Wh one sees figure A as composed o three black hen of k would be the edges of the white t circles w wedges cut out of the then one attends to t with c em, e these circles alone witho attending to s out g the straig lines that would be th edges of t white tria ght t he the angle.
3.1.2
How one takes the object to be
Cognitive states can have phenomenal character. There can be something it is like to understand a proposition. Switching between one’s cognitive states can thus involve phenomenal shifts. For instance, one experiences a phenomenal shift when thinking of the two different meanings of the sentence ‘visiting royalty can be boring’. This phenomenal shift is not perceptual: one can be thinking about the different meanings of this sentence with one’s eyes shut and without one’s other sense modalities being stimulated. It is natural to think that there is some shift in cognitive phenomenal character between thinking of the duck/rabbit figure as a duck and thinking of it as a rabbit. Bill Brewer relies exclusively on this factor in his account of aspect-switching:
‘[When] I see it as a duck, say, this is again a phenomenological change, but one of conceptual classificatory engagement with the very diagram presented to me. Similarly, when I shift aspects, and see it as a rabbit, there is an alteration in this phenomenology of the categorization of what is presented. (Brewer, 2006, p18).
3.1.3
Residual Visual Phenomenal Differences and Visual Imagination
One might argue that changes in one’s patterns of attention towards the duck/rabbit figure, and changes in how one takes the figure to be, do not fully explain the phenomenal shift that one experiences. One might argue that one can prevent one’s patterns of attention from changing, perhaps by looking only at the duck/rabbit’s eye and beak/ears, and still experience a visual phenomenal shift when one aspect-switches on the figure.
If it is possible to aspect-switch on ambiguous figures without any change in one’s patterns of attention, and if there is a residual specifically visual phenomenal difference between seeing the figure under the two aspects, then the above two factors that we have discussed are not sufficient to account for the phenomenon of aspect-switching.
We may appeal to states of visual imagination in order to explain the residual visual phenomenal difference. In particular, when one is looking at ambiguous figures, one may well be imagining unseen aspects of the figure. Unlike ordinary objects, ambiguous figures tend to be quite abstract, or lacking in detail. Thus it is not implausible to suppose that one’s visual imagination might ‘fill in’ some detail when one looks at ambiguous figures.
For instance, when one sees the ‘TOOT’ picture as a man wearing a hat with two strings hanging down each side, one may visually imagine the boundary of a face below the eyes. This may be all that one visually imagines. One may not visually imagine features of the face such as
a nose or a mouth. Merely visually imagining a small detail such as the boundary of the face would be sufficient to generate a visual phenomenal difference between seeing the picture as a man and seeing it as, say, a bridge. When one sees the figure as a bridge with two pipes passing underneath it, one may visually imagine the pipes as going off in such and such a direction. Again, this may be all that one visually imagines. Merely visually imagining brief lines going off in a certain direction would be sufficient to generate a visual phenomenal difference that would distinguish seeing the picture as a bridge from seeing it as a man.
The aim of appealing to visual imagination to explain any residual visual phenomenal differences that occur when one aspect-switches on an ambiguous figure, having fixed one’s patterns of attention, is that the phenomenal character of visual imaginative states is similar to (although not identical to) the phenomenal character of visual experiences. There seems to be a reason why visual imagination is called visual imagination. Thus shifts in one’s visual imaginative states may be able to account for the residual visual phenomenal differences in question.
I shall now consider three objections to the above appeal to visual imagination. Firstly, it does not seem, when we aspect-switch on ambiguous figures, that we are aware of vivid imaginative states concerning the unseen aspects of the picture. This seems correct. However, visual imaginative states need not be vivid. If one visually imagines the back of the door that one is seeing as green, then the visual imaginative state that one is in need not be especially vivid.
The second objection is that it is implausible to suppose that we imagine detailed images of unseen aspects of the picture. We addressed this objection above: it is sufficient to generate a visual phenomenal difference between seeing different aspects of an ambiguous figure that one visually imagines very few unseen details.
The third objection is as follows.
1.) Seeing a normal duck as a duck is the same phenomenon as seeing the duck/rabbit picture as a duck. 2.) When we see a normal duck as a duck, we are not visually imagining unseen aspects of the duck. Therefore, 3.) When we see the duck/rabbit picture as a duck, we are not visually imagining unseen aspects of the picture.
My reply to this objection is to reject 1.). We noted above that many ambiguous figures are abstract and lacking in detail. It seems plausible that one’s visual imagination is more active when one is looking at more abstract drawings; one’s imagination is more likely to fill in detail. If this is right, then, since the duck/rabbit drawing is relatively abstract, it is plausible to suppose that seeing it as a duck is different from standard cases of seeing ordinary ducks as ducks.
3.2
House/façade
Searle claims that a house will look different to one depending on whether one thinks of it as a house or as a mere façade. Strawson has also claimed that a bush against a wall will look different to one depending on whether one thinks of it as a bush or as a painting on the wall (Strawson, 1974a, p46). Let us suppose that the claims are that the house and the bush phenomenally look different depending on how one thinks of them.
By ‘façade’, Searle could have in mind the front wall of a house, or merely a large painting of a house. Let us first suppose that he has in mind a painting of a house. On this assumption, the case is that one is actually looking at a house, but one thinks one is looking at a painting of a house.
When thinking of the house as a painting, one’s patterns of attention may change. For instance, one may start to attend to the shadows that the window ledges cast, thinking that the painter has drawn these particularly well to convey an impression of depth. One may also attend to the different shades of colour of the front of the house, thinking that the painter has skilfully captured the way the apparent colour of that object can be affected by light falling unevenly on the surface of an object. Thus, when thinking of the house as a façade, there may be features of it that one attends to that one did not attend to when one thought of it as a house.
In addition to one’s patterns of attention changing, one may visually imagine the house as having the back that a painting would have, and this shift in one’s imaginative states would contribute to the phenomenal shift that one experiences. It may also be that thinking of the house
as a façade is phenomenally different from thinking of it as a house, and that this difference partly explains the phenomenal shift that one experiences when thinking of the house as a façade.
Let us now suppose that, by ‘façade’, Searle has in mind the front wall of a house. In this case if there is a phenomenal difference between thinking of the house as a house and thinking of it as a façade, it is unlikely that the above account of shifting patterns of attention would help explain it. To explain the phenomenal difference in this case, I would appeal to shifts in how one visually imagines the object to be, as well as shifts in how one thinks of the object. Thus, my account of Searle’s example draws on the same resources as my account of aspect-switching above.
3.3
Language acquisition and recognitional capacities
Siegel argues that the acquisition of certain conceptual abilities, such as the ability to read Russian and the ability to recognize pine trees, can make certain kinds of objects, such as Russian sentences and pine trees, phenomenally look different.
Siegel argues that there is a phenomenal difference between looking at a page before and after one learns Russian. This claim seems plausible. Inevitably some phenomenal shift will result just because, after one has learnt Russian, one can read the text on the page, whereas before one could not, and understanding the text on the page does have a certain kind of phenomenal character.
However, this account would not explain the visual phenomenal shift that occurs in this case. Siegel argues that, after one has learnt Russian, one ‘become[s] disposed to attend to the semantic properties of the words in the text.’ (Siegel, 2006). It is not clear that one needs to appeal to the idea of attending to semantic properties of the words in order to explain the visual phenomenal shift in question. An alternative explanation is that one becomes disposed to attend to the linguistically significant aspects of certain letters; aspects that distinguish those letters from other letters. For instance, there are two letters in the Cyrillic alphabet that differ only by the presence of a hook on the bottom of one of them. In Chinese the width, height and thickness of a stroke are relevant to determining which character it is part of. Learning Russian and Chinese will cause one to be disposed to attend to such features of the letters as these, and these altered patterns of attention towards texts in Russian and Chinese will produce a visual phenomenal shift.
If this explanation is correct, then the largest phenomenal shifts will occur when one learns a language which is written in an alphabet with which one is not familiar. A phenomenal shift may still occur when one learns a language which is written in an alphabet that one does know. The fact that one can read sentences written in the language will alter one’s patterns of attention to sentences written in that language. For instance, depending on the language, one may come to look at newly intelligible sentences in a systematic way from left to right, whereas before one learnt the language one might not have looked at the sentences in a systematic way from left to right, because one might not have been attempting to read them.
A similar explanation may be offered for the phenomenal difference that occurs when one learns to recognize pine trees. After one learns to recognize pine trees, one will start to attend to those features of pine trees that distinguish them from other trees, for instance the colour or thickness of the bark. Acquiring a recognitional disposition for pine trees will cause one’s patterns of attention to shift when one looks at a grove containing pine trees and other sorts of trees.
3.4
Phenomenally looking a new way
Suppose that acquiring a recognitional disposition for pine trees does cause pine trees phenomenally to look different. Suppose also that acquiring a recognitional disposition for tomatoes, a disposition which I shall henceforth call the concept tomato, causes tomatoes phenomenally to look different. I will now discuss the question what new property tomatoes phenomenally look to one to have after one acquires the concept tomato.
Someone might query at this stage the inference from ‘acquiring the concept tomato makes tomatoes phenomenally look different’ to ‘there is some new F such that acquiring the concept tomato makes tomatoes phenomenally look F’. However, this inference seems plausible. If x phenomenally looks different from y, then the way x phenomenally looks is different from the way y phenomenally looks. Given that any object x phenomenally looks a certain way iff x phenomenally looks to have a certain property, and given that it is doubtful that acquiring the
concept tomato makes tomatoes phenomenally look to have fewer properties, then the inference in question is valid.
I will now argue that, supposing that there is a property F such that acquiring the concept tomato causes tomatoes to look F, being F is not the property of being a tomato.
On twin-earth there are fruits that look and taste just the same as tomatoes do, but which are not tomatoes, as they are made from different molecules from tomatoes. Call these fruits on twin-earth ‘twin-tomatoes’. There is no visual phenomenal difference between the way that twintomatoes look to inhabitants of twin-earth and the way that tomatoes look to inhabitants of earth. Here we are assuming phenomenal internalism, which is as follows:
Phenomenal Internalism:
Necessarily, for all subjects s1 and s2, if s1 is a molecule-formolecule duplicate of s2, then s1 does not differ from s2 with respect to the phenomenal character of the mental states of s1 and s2.
Suppose that Oscar is an inhabitant of earth, and twin-Oscar is an inhabitant of twinearth. Developing the assumption we made above, just as Oscar’s acquisition of the concept tomato causes tomatoes phenomenally to look some new F to him, so twin-Oscar’s acquisition of the concept twin-tomato causes twin-tomatoes phenomenally to look some new F to him. It seems that the acquisition of the concept tomato will bring about the same kind of visual phenomenal shift as the acquisition of the concept twin-tomato. The argument for this claim is
that Oscar and twin-Oscar do not know the difference between tomatoes and twin-tomatoes, and they are thus in the same types of brain state, narrowly construed. Given phenomenal internalism, the acquisition of the concepts tomato and twin-tomato by Oscar and twin-Oscar will produce the same kind of visual phenomenal shift in Oscar and twin-Oscar.
Let us accept the claim that Oscar’s acquiring the concept tomato and twin-Oscar’s acquiring the concept twin-tomato bring about the same kind of visual phenomenal shift for Oscar and twin-Oscar. It follows that there is some new F such that Oscar’s and twin-Oscar’s acquisition of their respective concepts causes tomatoes and twin-tomatoes phenomenally to look F to Oscar and twin-Oscar respectively. If being F is the property of being a tomato, then twintomatoes will not be the way they phenomenally look to twin-Oscar. This is counter-intuitive, since twin-Oscar has as much right to say that being F is the property of being a twin-tomato, and that tomatoes are not the way they phenomenally look to Oscar. To avoid an asymmetric treatment of the cases, it seems that the only option is to hold that being F is neither the property of being a tomato nor the property of being a twin-tomato.
4
Determinabilism
I call the view that objects phenomenally look to have properties such as being red, being green and being blue, determinabilism. In this section I offer three arguments against determinabilism, and one argument which raises an issue concerning determinabilism, but which is ultimately inconclusive.
4.1
Colour Illusions
Suppose that the following facts obtain:
(i) (ii)
A is red21, and phenomenally looks red21. A is square, and phenomenally looks triangular.
Given that (i) and (ii) obtain, it seems appropriate to say (1):
(1) A is partly the way it phenomenally looks, but not entirely the way it phenomenally looks .
Suppose that the following fact obtains:
(iii)
B is red21, and phenomenally looks red22.
If determinabilism is true, then if B phenomenally looks red22, then, in addition, B phenomenally looks red. Assuming determinabilism, then if (iii) is true, it should be appropriate to assert (2).
(2) B is partly the way it phenomenally looks in respect of colour, but not entirely the way it phenomenally looks in respect of colour.
After all, if B phenomenally looks red, and if B is red, then it should follow that B is partly the way it phenomenally looks in respect of colour. However, (2) seems false. (3) seems a better description of the state of affairs.
(3) B is roughly the way it phenomenally looks in respect of colour, but not exactly the way it phenomenally looks in respect of colour.
In reply, the determinabilist might defend the maximally specific principle:
The Maximally Specific Principle: Expressions such as ‘the way that x looks in respect of colour’ are normally understood as concerning the most specific colour properties that x looks to have, rather than the determinable colour properties that x looks to have.
If the maximally specific principle is correct, then the determinabilist would have an explanation of why (2) seems false: we naturally understand the phrase ‘the way it phenomenally looks in respect of colour’ as referring to the most specific colour property that B phenomenally looks to have.
However, it is not clear that we should accept the maximally specific principle. In a context in which one is separating out green, red and blue objects, it seems that expressions such as ‘the way that x looks in respect of colour’ concern determinable colours such as green, red and blue, rather than specific shades of those colours. Similarly, in such a context expressions such as
‘the way that x is believed to be in respect of colour’ intuitively concern determinable colours such as green, red and blue rather than specific shades of those colours.
The fact that (2) seems false is therefore evidence that determinabilism is false.
4.2
The Vagueness Argument
Suppose that there is a sequence of colour patches, P1-P100, where P1 phenomenally looks red1, a clear shade of red, and subsequent patches in the sequence phenomenally look progressively less clear shades of red, and P100 phenomenally looks yellow20, a clear shade of yellow. This situation is displayed in figure 1.
Figure 1
P1
P2
P3
……………………
P100
Phenomenally looks:
Red1
Red2
Red3
Yellow20
According to the determinabilist, P1 phenomenally looks red in addition to phenomenally looking red1. Suppose that P50 phenomenally looks red50, and suppose that it is vague whether red50 is a shade of red. The determinabilist will presumably hold that it is vague whether P50
phenomenally looks red. After all, if P1 phenomenally looks red, it does not seem that there is a clear cut-off point in series at which the patches stop phenomenally looking red.
By ‘it is vague whether P50 phenomenally looks red’ one might loosely understand (1):
(1) It is vague whether the shade that P50 phenomenally looks is a shade of red.
However, (2) is the correct reading of ‘it is vague whether P50 phenomenally looks red’, and it is to claims such as (2) that the determinabilist is committed.
(2) It is vague whether the phenomenal looking relation holds between P50 and the property of being red.
(1) itself is not a controversial claim: it is a claim that an anti-determinabilist may accept.
If it is clear that P1 phenomenally looks red, and it is vague whether P50 phenomenally looks red, then the determinabilist seems committed to there being a varying level of vagueness in respect of the colours that P1-P50 phenomenally look. This seems counter-intuitive. It does not seem that the level of vagueness in how P1 and P50 phenomenally look in respect of colour is different. We will call the phenomenon of a varying level of vagueness with respect to the colour properties that objects phenomenally look varying phenomenal vagueness.
The determinabilist could avoid being committed to varying phenomenal vagueness only by saying that there is some colour determinable D such that it is vague whether red1 is a shade of D, and vague whether P1 phenomenally looks D. For instance, D may be reddish-brownish and the determinabilist may hold that it is vague whether red1 is a shade of reddish-brownish, and therefore that it is vague whether P1 phenomenally looks reddish-brownish. Moreover, the determinabilist will have to specify such determinables for every other patch in the sequence in order to avoid the consequence of varying phenomenal vagueness.
The intuitive support for determinabilism is that we say that objects look red. However, once it is pointed out that determinabilism, if it is to avoid being committed to varying phenomenal vagueness, entails that there are comparatively arbitrary determinables that objects phenomenally look, such as ones that begin three-quarters of the way through the red part of the colour spectrum and end half-way through the blue area of the colour spectrum, then determinabilism seems to be a less attractive view. Determinabilism captures some of our pretheoretic intuitions but at the same time has some slightly counter-intuitive consequences.
Thus, the fact that determinabilism seems to entail that objects phenomenally look to have comparatively arbitrary determinables is a minor cost of the view.
4.3
Phenomenal Looking To Have Determinables Alone
Suppose that there are one hundred colour patches, P1-P100, and each of P1-P100 phenomenally looks a different shade of red to one. Consider now a dog which is looking at P1P100, and which cannot discriminate the colour any patch phenomenally looks from the colour any other patch phenomenally looks.
Two hypotheses about how the patches phenomenally look to the dog are as follows. On the first hypothesis, there is a shade, F, such that one of the patches P1-P100 phenomenally looks F to us, and which is such that all of the patches P1-P100 phenomenally look F to the dog. For instance, F might be red56, or red17. On the second hypothesis, each of P1-P100 simply phenomenally looks red to the dog without phenomenally looking any particular shade of red to the dog.
If objects phenomenally look red to us, then this lends some support to the second hypothesis. One objection to the second hypothesis is that objects cannot phenomenally look red, and this objection would be countered if objects phenomenally look red to us. Let us assume that the second hypothesis is at least metaphysically possible. It seems very difficult to imagine how the patches would phenomenally look to the dog on the second hypothesis. That is, it seems very difficult to imagine what it would be like for an object phenomenally to look red without phenomenally looking any particular shade of red.
Consider the following argument against the determinabilist, formulated as a reductio ad absurdum. The argument is that, given 2.) and 3.), we should reject 1.).
1.) Objects phenomenally look red to us. 2.) If objects phenomenally look red to us, then we can visually imagine a red object that is no specific shade of red. 3.) We cannot imagine a red object that is no specific shade of red.
The argument for 2.) depends on the following two claims.
(i)
It is metaphysically possible that objects phenomenally look red without phenomenally looking a specific shade of red (the second hypothesis above).
(ii)
We have reliable introspective access to the ways that objects phenomenally look to us.
Suppose that an object O phenomenally looks red21 and red to us. Given (i) and (ii), it seems that we should be able to introspect on the ways that O phenomenally looks, which ways include the property of being red and the property of being red21, and visually imagine an object that phenomenally looks red but does not phenomenally look any particular shade of red. If we can do this, then we should be able visually to imagine an object that is red but no particular shade of red.
The determinabilist is likely to reject 2.). The determinabilist is likely to argue that, since objects that phenomenally look red always phenomenally look some specific shade of red, there
is a good explanation of why we cannot visually imagine an object as red without imagining it as a specific shade of red.
Suppose that it had been the case that objects that phenomenally look green always phenomenally look circular. A defender of 2.) will argue that in such a world we would be able to imagine an object as green without imagining it as circular. A determinabilist is likely to reject that claim.
It is not obvious whether 2.) is true or not. Therefore, this argument against the determinabilist is inconclusive.
4.4
Kinds of Colour Phenomenal Character
Given that (1) and (2) quantify over only actual objects, both seem plausible. An antideterminabilist will consider (2) to be vacuously true.
(1) For all objects x, and for all human subjects y, if x phenomenally looks red21 to y, then there is some location property F such that x phenomenally looks F to y. (2) For all objects x, and for all human subjects y, if x phenomenally looks red, then there is a shade of red F such that x phenomenally looks F to y.
Suppose that an object A phenomenally looks red21, and that A phenomenally looks at location l23. It seems that we are able to distinguish two kinds of phenomenal character that our visual experience of A has: a particular kind of colour phenomenal character and a particular kind of location phenomenal character. We can call the kind of colour phenomenal character red21-phenomenal character, and the kind of location phenomenal character l23-phenomenal character.
I will now discuss two cases that seem to count against determinabilism. The first is as follows. Suppose that an object B phenomenally looks red21. According to a determinabilist, B will also phenomenally look red. If the determinabilist is correct, it seems that we should be able to distinguish two kinds of colour phenomenal character that our visual experience of B has: red21-phenomenal character, and also a kind of colour phenomenal character possessed by all and only visual experiences of objects that phenomenally look red; we may call this kind of colour phenomenal character red-phenomenal character. However, when an object, x, phenomenally looks red21, it seems that we are not able to distinguish two kinds of colour phenomenal character that our visual experience of x has, namely red21-phenomenal character and red-phenomenal character. It seems that, when an object, x, phenomenally looks red21, we can distinguish just one kind of colour phenomenal character, namely red21-phenomenal character. This seems to be evidence that determinabilism is false.
The second case that seems to count against determinabilism is as follows. Suppose that B phenomenally looks red21 and that C phenomenally looks red22. One’s visual experience of B has red21-phenomenal character, and one’s visual experience of C has red22-phenomenal
character. Thus one’s visual experiences of B and C have very similar but distinct kinds of colour phenomenal character.
According to a determinabilist, B and C also phenomenally look red. If this is correct, then we should expect that one’s visual experience of B and one’s visual experience of C have a common kind of colour phenomenal character, namely red-phenomenal character. However, whilst one’s visual experience of B is very similar in respect of colour phenomenal character to one’s visual experience of C, it does not seem that there is a kind of colour phenomenal character with respect to which one’s visual experiences of B and C are identical. This seems to be evidence that determinabilism is false.
4.5
The Red Anti-Entailment Principle
The red anti-entailment principle is as follows:
The Red Anti-Entailment Principle:
For all objects x and y, x’s phenomenally looking red21 to y does not entail that x phenomenally looks red to y.
Anti-entailment principles have played a significant role in the arguments of this chapter. Perhaps the most controversial anti-entailment principle is the red anti-entailment principle. If the arguments above against determinabilism are sound, then the red anti-entailment principle is
correct, and if the red anti-entailment principle is correct, this bolsters the case for the other antientailment principles considered in this chapter.
5
Other Properties
5.1
Being the same shade as
I shall now consider whether it is ever the case that, for some x and y, x phenomenally looks the same shade as y, where ‘the same shade as y’ is within the scope of the ‘phenomenally looks’. I shall assume this reading of ‘x phenomenally looks the same shade as y’ in what follows.
Suppose that one sees two objects, A and B. It is a consequence of the phenomenal character principle that the property of being the same shade as B is not one that A phenomenally looks to have. This is because if A phenomenally looks the same shade as B, and if B is swapped for a duplicate C, and comes phenomenally to look the same shade as C, there would have to be a visual phenomenal difference between the ways that A looks at the different times. In fact there will be no such visual phenomenal difference, and it follows that A does not phenomenally look the same shade as B.
One might wonder whether a given object A may phenomenally look the same shade as some F, G, H object, where ‘some F, G, H object’ is within the scope of ‘phenomenally look’. In
what follows I shall argue that A does not phenomenally look the same shade as some F, G and H object.
Consider three objects, A, B, and C, and suppose that they all phenomenally look red56. Furthermore A phenomenally looks the same shade as an F, G and H object, whilst C does not phenomenally look the same shade as an F, G and H object. What visual phenomenal difference might there be between the way that A looks and the way that C looks? It seems that we cannot imagine what kind of visual phenomenal difference there would be, and this suggests that A does not phenomenally look the same shade as an F, G and H object.
The relevant anti-entailment principle is as follows:
The Same Shade Anti-Entailment Principle:
For all objects x, y and z, there are no properties F, G and H such that x’s phenomenally looking red21 to z and y’s phenomenally looking red21 to z entail that x phenomenally looks to z the same shade as some F, G and H object.
Someone might respond to the above argument by denying the same shade antientailment principle. However, if any case of phenomenally looking F entails phenomenally looking G, where F and G are different, one would have thought that phenomenally looking red21 entails phenomenally looking red. The fact that the latter entailment does not hold means that
there would have to be a special reason to deny the same shade anti-entailment principle, and it is not clear that there is such a reason.
We can apply the same argument to other relations, such as being the same length as. For instance, suppose there are three lines, A, B and C, and each line phenomenally looks length F. A phenomenally looks the same length as an F, G and H object, but C does not phenomenally look the same length as an F, G and H object. What visual phenomenal difference might we expect to notice between the way that A looks and the way that C looks? It seems that we cannot imagine such a visual phenomenal difference, and this suggests that A does not phenomenally look the same length as an F, G and H object.
5.2
Being square
Suppose that A and B are squares. Furthermore, suppose that the positions that A’s boundary points phenomenally look to have are arranged in a square, and the positions that B’s boundary points phenomenally look to have are arranged in a square. Furthermore, A phenomenally looks square and B does not phenomenally look square. What visual phenomenal difference might we expect to notice between the ways that A and B look? It seems that we cannot imagine what visual phenomenal difference there might be, and this suggests that objects do not phenomenally look square.
The relevant anti-entailment principle here is:
The Square Anti-Entailment Principle:
For all objects x and y, the fact that the positions that x’s boundary points phenomenally look to y to have are arranged in a square does not entail that x phenomenally looks square to y.
One could argue that the square anti-entailment principle is false. However, if the red anti-entailment principle is true, then one would have to have a special reason for denying the square anti-entailment principle. It is not clear what such a reason would be. Therefore it seems we have reason to think that objects do not phenomenally look square.
In the discussion of the tomato anti-entailment principle I assumed that objects phenomenally look to have shape properties. However, this assumption was not essential. It could have been replaced with the assumption that the position properties that various parts of the boundaries of the objects phenomenally look to have are arranged in a certain shape. I assume that the position properties that the boundary of a given object phenomenally look to have may be arranged in the shape, for example, of a square or a circle.
5.3
Having a certain length
Suppose that A and B are straight lines. A consists of dots A1-A10 and B consists of dots B1-B10. Furthermore, suppose that one sees dots A1-A10 and dots B1-B10, and that the position
that A1 phenomenally looks to be in is a distance of L from the position that A10 phenomenally looks to be in, and the position that B1 phenomenally looks to be in is L from the position that B10 phenomenally looks to be in. Furthermore, suppose that A phenomenally looks L long and B does not phenomenally look L long. What visual phenomenal difference might we expect to notice between the ways that A and B look? It seems hard to imagine what such a visual phenomenal difference might be, and this suggests that neither A nor B phenomenally looks to have a length.
The relevant anti-entailment principle here is:
The Length Anti-Entailment Principle:
For all objects x and y, if x is a straight line composed of visible dots x1-x10, where x1 is at the beginning of x and x10 is at the end of x, and where x1-x10 are all the same size, the fact that the position that x1 phenomenally looks to y to be in is L from the position that x10 phenomenally looks to y to be in does not entail that x phenomenally looks to y to have a length of L.
The argument for the length anti-entailment principle is similar to the argument for previous anti-entailment principles: that if the red anti-entailment principle is true, then there would have to be a special reason to think that the length anti-entailment principle is false. If the argument above is sound, then objects do not phenomenally look to have length properties. Since
length properties are one kind of size property, the argument suggests that objects do not phenomenally look to have size properties. A very similar argument to the one above would establish that objects do not phenomenally look to have size properties.
In the argument against the claim that some lines phenomenally look the same lengths as other lines, I assume that lines phenomenally look certain lengths. However, this assumption is not essential. It could be replaced by the assumption that various parts of the line phenomenally look to have various positions.
One might object to my argument that objects do not phenomenally look to have length properties by endorsing the following two principles:
The Unrestricted Seeing Principle:
Necessarily, for all objects w, x, y and z, if x and y compose z, then w sees x and y only if w sees z.
The Length Object-Property Principle:
Necessarily, for all objects x and y, x sees y only if there is a length property L such that y phenomenally looks L to x.
The length object property principle is so-called because it posits a connection between the objects one sees and the kinds of properties those objects phenomenally look to have.
It is not obvious why one should accept the length object-property principle. It is not obvious why, for instance, it is more plausible than the determinable colour object-property principle which holds that a subject S sees an object O only if there is a determinable colour D such that O phenomenally looks D to S. There may be some correct object-property principles. For instance, consider the following object-property principles:
The Colour Object-Property Principle:
Necessarily, for all objects x and y, x sees y only if there is a colour property C such that y phenomenally looks C to x.
The Position Object-Property Principle: Necessarily, for all objects x and y, x sees y only if there is a position property P such that y phenomenally looks P to x.
Even these principles are not self-evidently true. Suppose that A and B compose C, and that subject S sees A, B and C. As long as A and B phenomenally look to have colours and positions, prima facie it seems that S might be able to see C without C phenomenally looking to have a colour or position to S.
Furthermore, if one accepted the unrestricted seeing principle, then one might pause before accepting the position object-property principle. Suppose that any two objects compose a third, and therefore that the computer screen and the mug before me compose an object. Suppose I see both the computer screen and the mug. If the unrestricted seeing principle is correct, I see
the composite screen-mug object. If the position object-property principle is correct, then the screen-mug object phenomenally looks to have a certain position. Presumably this position property is the property of being, for two disjoint positions L* and L**, partly in L* and partly in L**. But it is not obvious that the property of being partly in L* and partly in L** is one that objects phenomenally look to have. Certainly this is a substantive claim.
Thus, it does not seem that there is any reason to accept the length object-property principle, and there is some controversy concerning whether any object-property principle is correct.
6
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued, using a combination of anti-entailment principles and applications of the phenomenal difference test, that, objects do not phenomenally look to have properties such as being a tomato, having changed, and being square. The arguments that I have employed are of a general form, and I believe that they apply, mutatis mutandis, to any properties that are not colour and position properties. Thus, I believe that arguments of the form used in this chapter show that objects phenomenally look to have just colour and position properties. In addition, I have also argued that the colour properties do not include determinable properties such as being red, or being coloured.
