Fixed Point Games

Where: University Of Oxford , Gorman Student Research Workshop in Economics When: 14th November 2008, 12pm - 2pm

A presentation of work in progress

A new class of games is defined in which players choose functions from the cross product of their competitors’ strategy spaces from some base game. This can be thought of as a static version of the equilibrium in response function literature. Analogues to the classical “Folk Theorems” are found for these games and considerable progress is made towards an exhaustive catalogue of the equilibria of such games in terms of the equilibria of the base game. These games potentially have applications in conflict resolution, and may also make some contribution towards explaining the “paradox” of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

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