

# Richard Price

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## Contact:

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Date of birth: 07/03/80

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## Education:

- 2003-2006 **D.Phil** in Philosophy, Oxford University  
2004 – Prize Fellow of All Souls College (one of two admitted per year by examination)  
2003 – 2004 Holder of Graduate Studentship at Corpus Christi College
- 2001-2003 **B.Phil** in Philosophy, Oxford University  
St Catherine’s College
- 1998-2001 **B.A.** in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, Oxford University  
St Catherine’s College  
Degree: 1<sup>st</sup>
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## Academic:

**D.Phil Title:** *The Ways Things Look*  
Abstract: The thesis concerns the distinction between visible and non-visible properties. I define a kind of looking, phenomenal looking, and explore what properties objects phenomenally look to have. I argue that objects phenomenally look to have only colours and positions.

**Areas of Specialization:** Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology

**Areas of Competence:** Metaphysics, Kant

**Publications:** 'Content Ascriptions and the Reversibility Constraint', *Philosophical Perspectives*, volume 19 (1), Blackwell, 2005, 353-374

**Talks:** 'Just Colours and Positions', The Admissible Contents of Experience, Glasgow University, March 2007.

'Colour Space and Fineness of Grain', *Ockham Society* (the society for philosophy graduate students at Oxford), November 2005  
'Relational Looking and the Reversibility Constraint', *Harvard-MIT Graduate Conference*, March 2005  
'The Nature of Visual Space', *Ockham Society*, March 2005  
'Varieties of Paradox', *The Invariants Society*, January 2005  
'What Properties Does Experience Represent?', *National Postgraduate Analytic Philosophy Conference*, Cambridge, July 2005  
'Relational Looking and the Reversibility Constraint', *Warwick Graduate Conference*, November 2004  
'Vagueness and The Content of Experience', *Ockham Society*, June 2004.  
'What Properties Does Experience Represent?', *NYU-Columbia Graduate Conference*, March 2004  
'Is The Content of Experience Nonconceptual?', *Ockham Society*, May 2002  
'Reply' to Jerry Fodor's 'Having Concepts: A Brief Refutation of Practically Everything', *Oxford Graduate Philosophy Conference*, November 2002.

**Teaching**

**Experience:**

Knowledge and Reality Tutorials (Corpus Christi College, St Anne's College, St Catherine's College)

Philosophy of Mind Tutorials (Blackfriars, Mansfield College)

**Professional**

**Service:**

I have acted as a referee for the Philosophical Quarterly. I have helped organize the Oxford Graduate Conference for three years.